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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the role of public policy, with specific 
reference to public sector pricing, in an economy where all markets do 
not necessarily clear. The discussion focuses on three non-Walrasian 
market situations termed, in the nomenclature of Malinvaud and others, 
as: Keynesian Unemployment, Classical Unemployment and Repressed
Inflation. In chapter 1, there is a brief summary of the literature in 
this area. The framework of the model used, is described in some 
detail in chapter 2.
In chapter 3, the role of the traditional instruments of 
taxation and public expenditures is analysed in the framework of the 
present model. The "non-traditional" instrument of public sector 
pricing throws up some interesting results. Among other things, my 
results indicate that public sector pricing can be designed to 
effectively influence the level of aggregate income and employment.
The method of financing the government deficit is the subject 
of chapter 4. My results indicate that the bond-financed multiplier of 
Blinder and Solow or Tobin and Buiter is simply a special case of the 
multiplier in my model, when the public sector enterprise prices its 
output at marginal cost. Equally important, I establish that the 
Blinder-Solow result "the long-run multiplier for bond-financed 
deficit spending exceeds that for money-financed deficit spending" is 
not necessarily true. Furthermore, the stability and convergence 
properties of the system are shown to rest on the choice of public 
sector prices.
The characterisation of optimal public sector prices is dealt 
with in chapters 5 and 6, viewed from a different perspective in each 
of the chapters. In chapter 5, optimal pricing rules are derived which 
are explicit and readily operational. Finally, in chapter 6, we
characterise the dynamic time-path of optimal public sector prices.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis aims to analyse the effectiveness of public 
sector production as an instrument of fiscal policy in a dynamic 
quantity constrained macroeconomic model.
In the basic Walrasian models, market clearing is taken as an 
axiom through the actions of a ghost "auctioneer", and is not based on 
any microeconomic analysis of price making behaviour. However, real 
world markets with the exception, perhaps, of the stock market do not 
conform to these characteristics. In most cases, the assumption of 
competitive market clearing does not hold even as an approximation, 
there being several factors explaining this. First, some prices are 
subject to institutional constraints where prices are fixed by 
legislation, for example, minimum wages. Secondly, the prices of many 
products are currently set in the framework of imperfect competition. 
Product differentiation and advertising have partially replaced price 
competition. In such a context, prices are no longer determined by the 
equality of demand and supply, and price response to changes in 
conditions of supply and demand may be substantially modified. Lastly, 
exchange relations in labour markets are contractual in nature, and 
the "spot-market paradigm" does not apply since most contracts are of 
longer term.
Having recognised the weakness of the above approach, one of
the most basic insights of the non-Walrasian school is that, in the
short-run, adjustments will be made through quantities as well as
prices. This is the central idea of Keynes (1936) where the level of
activity takes on the role of an adjustment variable in much the same
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way as the interest rate in the money market or other price variable. 
While Walrasian models, by definition, cover only the case where all 
markets clear, non-Walrasian models enable a study, both at the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic levels, the consequences of numerous 
schemes of price and expectations formation. Agents here form 
expectations not only on price signals but on quantity signals as 
well. Each agent may have his own scheme of expectations, which may be 
be "rational" or otherwise, so that this cover a large number of 
specifications.
As an immediate corollary, an important characteristic of 
non-Walrasian models is that they yield a large array of equilibrium 
concepts by considering more general price mechanisms that allow for 
quantity and mixed price-quantity adjustments in the short-run. In 
this sense, they generalise traditional microeconomic concepts and 
this, in turn, results in a similar generality at the macroeconomic 
level. This approach seems more general than the new classical method 
which assumes market clearing or the traditional Keynesian approach 
which considers states of excess supply only. Non-Walrasian models, by 
their very nature, endogenously generate a multiplicity of subregimes, 
which renders them an excellent tool to synthesize apparently 
conflicting theories, to show the limits of each, and to actually 
generalize by introducing new possibilities.
This class of models seems to best explain the wide-spread 
occurance of short and medium term unemployment of labour. The 
involuntary nature of the unemployment points to a rationing of the 
available labour supply in the sense that a large proportion of 
households are unsuccessful in finding the jobs that they seek at the 
prevailing market wages and prices. The consequences as well as causes
of this type of market failure are not confined to the particular 
market in which it is observed to occur. The writings of Clower (1985) 
and Leijonhufvud (1986, 1973) recognise the "general equilibrium"
aspects of the rationing. Malinvaud (1977) succinctly states 
"rationing on the labour market is related to, and dependent on, 
rationing in the goods market."
The schematic occurance of events ( in a stylised form, for 
purposes of analytical simplicity) is as follows: an insufficient
demand in the goods market leads to a correspondingly small level of 
demand in the labour market from profit maximising private 
entrepreneurs who would not produce more than is demanded, i.e. a 
rationing of the labour supply, and the resulting low incomes lead to 
a low aggregate demand and hence, rationing of suppliers in the 
product market. In the wake of the articles by Leijonhufvud and 
Clower, the 1970s saw the significant contributions of Barro and 
Grossman (1971), Dreze (1975), Benassy (1975) and Malinvaud (1977) to 
analyse a wide range of policy issues.
The quantity constrained equilibrium concept was first used 
in a simple general equilibrium model by Barro and Grossman (1971). 
Two rigorous formalisations of this are by Dreze (1975) and Benassy 
(1975). In both, prices ar taken as fixed, and agents maximise utility 
or profits taking as given not only prices but also the rationing of 
the quantities which they may buy or sell. The two formulations are 
equivalent with regard to the levels of trade. The essential 
difference arises from the fact there is no excess supply or demand in 
the Dreze framework. This is a draw-back of the Dreze analysis since 
the original motivation was to model trade under conditions in which 
demand did not match supply. A thorough investigation of these models
is provided in Drazen (1980).
Plan of thesis
The innovative feature in this thesis is the extension of 
government activity to include production of goods for private 
consumption. Within this, there are two objectives. First is to 
examine how the standard resuts concerning fiscal policy in 
conventional macroeconomic theory are extended, and perhaps modified 
by the new policy instrument of public enterprise production. This is 
the subject of chapter 3, where three non-Walrasian market situations 
are studied in some depth. Furthermore, the traditional approach to 
macroeconomic theory postulates ad hoc behavioural relationships while 
the present work is based on an overlapping generations model with 
well specified microeconomic foundations, some important examples of 
the former being Blinder and Solow (1973), Christ (1967, 1968, 1979), 
Tobin and Buiter (1976) and a host of others.
The present model, discussed in detail in chapter 2, has two 
assets, money and bonds. Though money earns no interest, it is assumed 
to provide liquidity services which is reflected in real balances 
being an argument of the individual utility function. The introduction 
of bonds as an additional financial asset breaks the rigid 
"proportionality" relationship between money and real output that 
would occur in the absence of the second asset, bonds. To model bonds, 
in any serious way, requires taking account of the inter-temporal 
consumption and saving behaviour of individuals. For this, an 
overlapping generations framework seemed the most natural choice, 
which also facilitates an investigation into the dynamics of the 
government budget constraint.
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The two most significant contributions on the financing of 
the government deficit are by Blinder and Solow (1973) and Tobin and 
Buiter (1976), written as a counter to monetarists claiming the 
inefficacy of fiscal policy. It seemed in place to review the results 
of the previous authors, in the extended context of the current model, 
and to examine the role of public sector pricing, in particular. This 
is studied in chapter 4, and it is established that public secor 
pricing is a key element both in the efficacy of policy as well as in 
the stability of the system.
The second objective seen as a further development of 
quantity constrained models is the focus on "optimal" public sector 
pricing, optimal in the sense of maximising social welfare. There are 
two levels at which this problem is addressed. In an economic 
environment where policy decisions are centralised, the appropriate 
pricing rules would take into consideration all macroeconomic 
multiplier effects. This appoach would be in line with the work of 
Dreze (1984), where he derives optimal pricing rules, as a second-best 
solution, for the public sector firm operating under a budget 
constraint in an economy facing Keynesian unemployment. The background 
to the Dreze results is the classic work of Boiteux (1956); though no 
rationing situation is assumed, the presence of a budget constraint in 
itself points to a departure from Pareto efficiency. In chapter 5, we 
derive optimal pricing rules for the public sector enterprise in an 
economic setting similar to that of the previous authors but in the 
framework of an overlapping generations model, and which takes account 
of the financing mechanism of the government budget.
At a second level of analysis of optimal pricing rules, the
11
use of an overlapping generations model permits us to characterise the 
time-path of optimal public sector prices. This is the subject of 
chapter 6. The pricing rules indicate that the method of financing the 
budget deficit needs to be taken into account explicitly since the 
associated costs would actually differ. As a topic for future 
research, it is intended to investigate the role of public sector 
prices, which may be viewed as indirect taxes, in comparison with 
lump-sum taxes.
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Chapter 2
A Model with Su p p Iv  and Demand Constraints
(1) The Frame-work of Analysis
In this chapter, we introduce and build the frame-work 
of the model used in our analysis.
We adopt the Benassy formulation (1975) where the 
actual or transacted volume of output and employment is governed by 
the short side of the market. This is a choice guided by two 
considerations. First, the Keynesian view of the economy as capable 
of experiencing significant and sustained unemployment appears to be 
best explained in terms of models of quantity constrained equilibrium 
in a way in which other models cannot. Second, by its simplicity, 
Benassy's concept allows models to be tractable at the macro-economic 
level.
Three different non-Walrasian situations are analysed, 
each characterised by identifying the set of markets in 
disequilibrium. The agents in the economy are: the public sector, 
private firm and the household-consumer. The public and private firms 
supply two disjoint sets of consumption goods, G and Y, respectively 
using labour as the sole variable input, supplied by households. Both 
Y and G are perishable, and cannot be carried over from one period to 
another. The total number of commodities is 5: labour, L, money, M,
bonds, B, and the goods G and Y listed above, resulting in 4 relative 
prices. By Walras Law, we can suppress the market clearing condition 
for any one of the 5 commodities, which in our model is bonds.
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Throughout the analysis, we maintain that the markets for the 
government produced good, G, and money are always cleared so that 
disequilibrium arises because either individually the market for 
labour and for the output of the private sector fails to clear, or 
both fail to clear.
The types of disequilibria discussed are: a) both
markets exhibit excess supply, a situation termed, in the literature, 
as "Keynesian" unemployment, b) alternatively, both the product and 
labour markets experience excess demand, in which event, the economy 
is said to have "Repressed" inflation, c) the commodity market (Y) is 
in excess demand while the labour market has excess supply in a state 
of "Classical" unemployment, and finally, the degenerate case of d) 
with excess demand in the labour market combined with excess supply in 
the product market. In the absence of inventories, the last case 
violates profit maximising behaviour of private firms so that we need 
consider only the first three listed above. A formal statement of the 
market clearing conditions for the non-Walrasian cases considered here 
is postponed to the next section, after a fuller description of 
individual behaviour.
The problem is posed in the intertemporal framework of 
an overlapping generations (OLG) model. An innovative feature of the 
present analysis is the introduction of financial assets, money and 
bonds, whereby a generation saves for its future consumption. Money 
plays the role of both a medium of exchange as well as a store of 
value, a role similar to that in the work of Barro and Grossman 
(1971,1976) and Malinvaud (1977). A major drawback of the original 
versions, from a fiscal policy viewpoint, is that only one asset is 
considered - money. This implies that a comparison of its results
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with the standard ones based on an IS-LM model is not possible since a 
distinction cannot be made between monetary and fiscal policy changes. 
All changes in the government deficit have to be money financed, and 
all changes in the money supply have to be accompanied by a dificit of 
corresponding size. In order to break this rigid relationship, I 
introduce the possibility of bond financing which in turn means 
introducing in the model an additional good, bonds. More about this 
point at a later stage.
A factor in favour of using an overlapping generations 
model is that it provides an excellent alternative to assuming an ad 
hoc demand for assets. The demand for bonds/money is the result of 
inter-temporal optimisation by households, rather than by putting them 
in a single-period utility function as in Hool's (1980) extension of 
the model of Barro and Grossman or the Malinvaud model to include 
bonds. Gale (1983) uses an OLG framework but suffers the limitations 
mentioned above of having a single asset. Rankin (1984), excellent in 
its ■ underlying microeconomic foundations, works with a 2-asset 
overlapping generations model but the focus of analysis is different.
Another major difference arises in that, in the present 
approach, government spending is confined not merely to what is 
commonly termed in the literature as "wasteful" expenditure but also 
extends to the public production of a good for private consumption. 
Cuddington, et. al. (1980) make a similar attempt in that government 
engages in both productive and "unproductive" ventures but a 
comparison of the results cannot be made since the private and 
publicly produced goods are no different for consumption purposes, 
pre-empting the need for rules of optimal public sector pricing.
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The Model
We now discuss in some detail the behaviour of each of 
the agents in the economy.
(2.1) Private Firm
The production function for the private sector firm is:
Y = f(ly), f'>0, f "  < 0 (1)
where ly = labour input of Y.
We assume that firms do not hold inventories or invest, 
so that net sales are equal to output, and hence firms are not 
required to form expectations. Also, all profits are distributed to 
workers, a scheme which we can think of as a form of profit-sharing 
agreement. Ofcourse, there are other possible schemes of income
distribution, for instance, the Kaldorian one, which are centered on
the different uses of wage and profit income. But for reasons of
simplicity, and also since the focus of this thesis is not to
construct a macroeconomic theory of income distribution, the present 
assumption appears to be a reasonable choice.
The unconstrained or notional product supply, YS/I1 and 
labour demand, l<},n' are a solution to the firm's objective of 
maximising profits:
Max. IT = PyY-wly (1-1)
s.t.
f(ly ) > *
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where,
Py = price of Y
w = wage rate
Ys,n anc* ^d,n are, hence, functions of the real wage
and given as:
(2.1)
and,
(2.2)
Next, consider the case where the firm's output is
constrained by deficient product demand to Y, say, but is not
constrained by the available labour supply. Then, the "effective"
supply of Y, YB / e t i.e. the level of output taking account of the
demand constraint, is a solution to profit maximising with the
additional constraint Ys ^ Y. And the resulting demand for labour is 
at a lower level than in (2.1), and also less than the available 
labour supply. In this case,
(3.1)
and
^ e  - f-1(X)= f[w/( Py“/0] ^ ld,n = f“1(w/py ) (3.2)
^d,e — ^s,n (3.3)
where
ls,n = notional labour supply of the household
= effective labour demand of the firm
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and,
ft = multiplier associated with Y, and is interpreted as 
the marginal gain associated with relaxing Y or increasing aggregate 
demand for Y. Equation (3.2) indicates that at the profit maximising 
labour demand under rationing, marginal product of labour exceeds the 
real wage, resulting in lower labour demand than in the unconstrained 
situation as depicted in Fig.l below. This situation is typically a 
feature of Keynesian unemployment, and constitutes the basis for 
arguments from some quarters favouring real wage cuts to reduce 
unemployment.
Fig.l
0
Finally, if labour supply is the limiting factor on private 
production, and rationed to, say, 1 then the effective supply of Y 
subject to this input constraint is:
ys,e “ f( D  <4-x>
and,
ld,n * I <4-2>
Therefore, Ya and la,y' t i^e transacted or actual volume 
of production and employment in the private sector respectively, 
covering the three possibilities above, may be written as:
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(5.1)
transacted amount of Y
and,
(5.2)
actual employment in the private sector
As an illustration, we shall later consider the specific 
form of the production function given as:
where k is a positive constant. So, f'>0 and 0 if 0< k ^ 1,
denoting a positive but decreasing or constant marginal product of 
labour, and for the particular case of k=l, we have a CRS production 
technology. This function will be used widely in subsequent analysis.
(2.2) Public Sector Firm
production of a privately consumed commodity G (that actually enters 
the individual utility function), relaxing the often assumed bounds to 
the government's role of providing services that are of no direct 
utility to consumers.
Y - f(ly) = (ly)k (6)
A novel feature of the public sector here is its
The government produces G subject to its production 
function, and to its revenue constraint where the production function
19
is given as:
G = Q(lg), Q'>0, Q ' ' £ 0 (7.1)
and
lg = labour input of G (7.2)
The profit maximising labour demand for G would be such
that:
pg = w/Q'(lg) (7.3)
where the right-hand side is the cost of a marginal unit of G.
However, one of the important questions facing a public
sector enterprise is whether or not to follow marginal cost pricing, 
and to examine the situations warranting deviations therefrom at the 
price of efficiency. It is this latter problem that is analytically 
interesting, and dealt with here. We now consider a specific form of 
the production function to illustrate this point. Suppose that the 
production function of G takes the specific form of:
where 0 > 0 so that Q' > 0 .  In the particular case of 6 = 1, public 
sector production is characterised by constant returns to scale. 
Labour demand is then solved for simply as: l<jfg = G and, if now the 
government undertaking opts for marginal cost pricing, then Pg is 
simply equated to w, the prevailing wage since marginal product of 
labour in the public sector is unity. Similarly, we could just as 
well have considered alternative pricing rules as also different 
technologies of 6 \ 1, representing decreasing or increasing returns.
G = Q(lg) = (lg)1/0 (8)
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But at this stage, we limit ourselves to this brief introduction, 
intended merely as a "preview", as it were, to the analytics of public 
sector pricing.
It is assumed that the market for the government produced 
good is always cleared, and that there are no capacity constraints on 
the provision of G so that the demand for labour is lg = Q”^(G). 
Alternatively, we could have a situation where the public sector does 
not supply all that is demanded of its output as implicitly assumed 
above. This would effectively imply a rationing of G. Then, in the 
Keynesian unemployment case, over-all, we would have an environment 
where the consumer faces a constraint in his demand for G and none in 
his demand for Y while his labour supply is restricted by aggregate 
labour demand. At a subsequent stage, Classical Unemployment is 
considered where there is rationing of both labour supply and the 
demand for the private good so that in some sense the effects of 
rationing of product demand is dealt with. But, if we choose to 
restrict the consumption of G , then, both Y and G demand will be 
rationed while in the Keynesian Unemployment regime only G would be 
rationed and Y is available to the extent demanded. Therefore, 
rationing of G as well implies four alternative possibilities in the 
goods markets itself where Y may or may not be rationed and likewise, 
G may or may not be rationed. Allowing for the labour market, we have 
an additional set of possible market situations. For simplicity, and 
also because the thrust of this paper is to capture the effects of 
rationing of the private sector output, attention is focussed on the 
case set out originally - G unrationed with Y rationed or otherwise.
In the sections to follow, we deal with deriving the 
rules for the optimal pricing of G and related issues. The analysis
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dealt with now is true for any pg, the public sector price.
The specification of the revenue constraint follows from 
the role the government plays in this economy. Not only does the 
government produce a good for private consumption, its functions 
extend beyond to incurring expenditure Z on purchases of the private 
good, Y, for its other activities and also raising lump-sum taxes, T. 
These other activities are items such as the provision of parks, 
defense, intelligence on the African National Congress in the case of 
some "friendly countries" of South Africa, and such other. With 
reference to the individual consumer, it is assumed that public 
expenditures of this kind do not enter his utility function so that it 
has often been treated as "waste" in the literature.
On the financial side, the government issues bonds, B^ ., 
at date t each priced at qt. There is no private sector debt so that 
government is the sole agent issuing bonds which are of single-period 
duration. The maturity value is one unit of money so that the interest 
rate rt is (l/qt)-l. Taxes, money supply increases and new bond issues 
are used, together or in some combination, to finance the government 
expenditures Z, any deficits incurred in the supply of G and to redeem 
the existing bond stock, Bt-1* Therefore, the government budget 
constraint is:
$ = -(wtlg^t - pg^tGt) -(Zt-Tt ) + Mt- + q^Bt -Bt_1=0 (9)
which may be re-written as:
wt^g,t_Pg,tGt+ (1”^t)Bt-l + zt”Tt = (Mt “Mt-l)+<3t(Bt”Bt-l) (10)
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Changes in the outstanding bond stock are represented on the R.H.S. of
(10) while the current interest payments are given on the L.H.S.
Under the assumptions made so far, total labour demand, 
L^, is simply the aggregation across the demands of the private and 
public sector firms:
Ld ~ ^d,y + ^d,g (H)
(2.3)Households
Consumers live for two periods. There are no bequests. 
A household born in period t lives for 2 periods, t and t+1, and seeks 
to maximise life-time utility defined as:
U = U(Ct,Ct+1) (12)
where
Ct = (xt/gt'rot'bt)
= consumption demand of young of generation t
ct+l = (xt+l'9t+l)
= demand when old of generation t
x = consumption demand for Y, the good
produced by the private firm
g = consumption demand for G, the Government
produced good
m = demand for money balances
b = demand for bonds
The subscripts, t and t+1, refer to the first and second
periods of life of a generation born in time t, say. All generations 
are assumed to be identical in tastes, and their resource endowments 
of labour, L. Though money earns no interest, it is assumed to 
provide "liquidity" services which is reflected in having real money 
balances as an argument of the individual utility function. Feenstra 
(1986) shows that it may be exactly derivable from explicit models of 
transactions demand, under suitable assumptions.
Labour does not enter the utility function because we 
assume the household has no utility for leisure, and desires to work 
as much as possible. Households have a labour endowment L in period 1 
and zero in period 2. This implies that total wage income is wL if 
there are no constraints on labour supply. Since all profits are
re-distributed, households own all production as well as supply labour
in the first period of their life. These assumptions greatly simplify 
analysis of the 2nd period for generation t: in period 2, generation t 
is not interested in the labour market conditions since it has zero 
labour endowment and zero profit income. Therefore, the household 
does not need to form expectations of future labour rationing because 
this becomes irrelevant. In the second period when the household 
retires from work, consumption expenditures are met out of net savings 
accrued from the active life of period one. Following these
assumptions, the total gross income, K, defined as the sum of private 
profits and wage earnings, is:
K = n + wL = pyY+ wig (13)
if the household faces no labour supply rationing.
In the unconstrained situation, the consumer chooses Ct
24
and Ct+i so as to maximise (12) subject to:
Rdt s Kt"Tt = Py,txt + Pg,t9t + + <Jtbt <13>'
and,
(Py,t+1) xt+l = mt + bt (14>
where
Kt = total income in period t 
K^t = disposable income 
Py,t+1 = expected price of good Y in time t+1.
Tt = lump-sum taxes at time t. 
bt = number of bonds
qt = issue price per bond
Constraint (14) excludes g^+i because it is assumed that 
the consumer demands 6 only when he is young, e.g. college education 
that is provided by, say, the State university system. In terms of 
expectations formation, all that is required of generation t is to 
form expectations on the 2nd period price level, pf+i,y / at time t 
since g£+i = 0 by assumption. Eliminating bt, constraints (13) and 
(14) are combined as the budget constraint below:
Kt_Tt = Py, txt + Pg,t9t + (<ItP?,t+l>xt+l + ^ “S t ^ t  (15>
The optimal consumption demands may be written as:
xt 33 x tRdt 'P y ,t 'Pg,t'P y ,t+1 • ^ t 1 (16.1)
9t = 9[K^t»Py,t,Pg,t,Py,t+l,^t1 (16.2)
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mt = m[Kdt ,pyrt/pgft/p©/t+1,qt ] (16.3)
bt = b[Kdt ,Pyft,Pgft/pe/t+1,qt ] (16.4)
The rationale for holding money which is non-interest 
bearing when there exists the choice of investing all savings in 
interest yielding bonds is justified on the type of arguments used by 
Brock(1974), Hicks (1935). The theory of the demand for money has two 
main reasons: risk and transactions costs. But since both of these
introduce considerable complications, I assume the common short-cut of 
supposing that real money balances provide utility. The rationale for 
money demand underlying this assumption is closer to transactions 
demand theories than to asset demand ones: money is seen as reducing 
the loss of leisure otherwise involved in purchasing goods, or 
reducing the necessary sacrifice of consumption itself.
(2.4)Alternative Rationing Mechanisms
(i) Next, we investigate the effects on consumer demand and
labour supply of rationing in the private product and labour markets. 
When there is excess supply in the labour market, the household faces 
a rationing of its desired level of employment to 1, say, because now 
the firm's unconstrained labour demand determines the actual volume of 
employment since:
^d,n = f* ^(W/Py) - ls,n = Ji_^d,g (17)
where l8/n is the notional labour supply of the (unconstrained) 
household to the private firm net of governnment's labour demand, 
ld,g. Though the going wage rate is common to both the sectors, the
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fact that the government is not constrained means it gets priority in 
meeting its labour demand, leaving the private sector to be content 
with the residual labour supply of L- l<},g*
The optimal consumption levels are a solution to the 
household maximising its utility function (12) subject to (15) and the 
additional constraint (17) as well. The labour supply constraint on 
households implies that their effective labour supply to the private 
firm is restricted to some level .1, as determined by the latter, and 
employment-constrained total income of the household, Kd '', is now 
given by:
Kd "  = n  + w(l + lg) - T ^ II + wL - T (18)
where 1 is the constrained employment level in the private sector. At
the lower income level, it is to be expected that the constrained
demands are smaller correspondingly. But since total income, be it 
Kd '' or Kd, is in both cases exogenous to the consumer (because labour 
supplied is either L or 1, does not enter the utility function, and we 
do not have a labour supply function), the functional form of the 
Walrasian and constrained demand functions for all goods other than Y 
are the same. However, the excess demand for Y implies rationing of 
consumer demand; specifically, I assume, throughout the analysis, that 
production of Y is at least sufficient to meet the demands of
government and the old who are not rationed in any way. But suppose 
that the young are uniformly curtailed in their demand for Y to some 
level x*, say. Neary and Stiglitz (1983), hereafter referred to as 
NS, give a comprehensive and excellent discussion of the properties of 
constrained demand and supply functions, the results of which will be 
drawn upon in our subsequent analysis.
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(ii) Lastly, we consider the effects of constraints on consumption 
demand. If excess demand for Y rations consumption demand to X, say, 
then the income available for expenditure on the other goods is the 
residual disposable income, Kd? given by:
Kd* = Kd - pyX (19)
The optimal consumption levels of gt and mt are 
determined as before by maximising the utility function subject to the 
budget constraint (15), and the additional constraint xt = X/ the 
residual income Kd* <Kd . Note, the arguments in the optimal solution 
for consumption demands now includes X, since the consumption demands 
are given by:
9t ~ 5[KdJ,Pp,t+l.Pg,t'1f£] (20.1)
n*t a rIlIK\fPyJt+iiPg/t»9t'-l (20.2)
bt = b(Kdt'Py,t+l'Pg,t'<It?£] (20.3)
where the upper bar g, 5 and m indicate constrained demands. As 
mentioned earlier, the Neary and Stiglitz results on the spill-over 
effects of such constrained demands are drawn upon in our subsequent 
analysis.
With reference to the consumption demand of the old, 
they simply consume an amount equal to the value of their outstanding 
assets at the beginning of the period:
xl“1 = (bt-l + “t-l>/Py,t
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(21),
and are, by assumption, never rationed in their demand.
(2 .5)Properties of the demand/supply functions
At this point, I discuss the properties of the demand 
functions (16) and (2 0 ) since they are crucial in determining the 
behaviour of the model. Denote x^+i = cf as demand for future
consumption, and substitute this along with (16) into the budget 
constraint, (15). Differentiating this with respect to income yields:
1 = Pyxk + Pg9k + <<JtPy,t+l)cf,k + (l“<It>mk <22>
The time subscripts on current consumption demands are suppressed to 
avoid notational clutter, and xk=8x/0K, gk= 8g/0K, etc. If all goods 
are assumed strictly "normal", then
0 < pyxk, pggk, (Py,t+l<It)cf,k' (1-<3t>mk < 1 (23>
We consider the price derivatives next. From (15), it 
is clear that a change in brings about a change both in the "price" 
of future consumption, qt, and of money, (l-qt). Denote these prices 
as vt and rt , respectively, without constraining rt = l-vt . The 
derivatives Xq, gq and mq are decomposed to give:
xq = xv - xr, (24.1)
9q = 9v — (24.2)
mg = mv - mr (24.3)
where Xq, gq, mv, etc. are interpreted as the usual price 
derivatives.
These can, therefore, be split using the Slutsky equation as:
xv
io>Xn cfxk xr
_ xc 
xr - mxk (25.1)
9v
io>O'II cf9k 9r i
i <Q - m9k (25.2)
mv = m£ - Cfmk mr = m£ - mmk (25.3)
where the superscript c refers to a compensated derivative. So, (25) 
may be re-written as:
xq = lxv " xr 1 “ tcf “ m lxk (26>
gq = [9y “ 9rl “ Icf " m l9k <27)
mq = [m^ - m£] - [Cf - m]mk (28)
The RHS terms correspond to the net substitution and net 
income effects. The most common signs assumed for Xg,gg and mg would 
be that all three be positive, indicating a negative dependence of 
both commodity consumption and money demand on the interest rate. We 
see under what conditions this occurs. If desired money holdings are 
less than total desired savings, i.e. if m < Cf , then (continuing to 
assume all goods are normal) both net income effects are negative. 
Next, if all goods are net substitutes, so x£, x£, g^, g£, m^ > 0, 
then the net substitution effect on money demand is positive (because 
own price effect of money, mr must be negative), while that on 
consumption is ambiguous. If, instead, money is a net complement to 
current consumption, i.e. x§ and g£ <0 , the net substitution effect 
on consumption is positive. The upshot of this is that a variety of 
configurations of signs of Xg, gg and mg is possible. Given this, we 
shall consider the "familiar" case, where Xg, gg, mg > 0 , in
subsequent ananlysis although that there are other possibilities 
should not be lost sight of. A sufficient condition for this would be
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the assumption of homotheticity of the instantaneous utility fuction 
to help ensure that the demand for both goods declines.
As we shall see, the sign of the expression, xkmq-mkXq, 
is equally important for some of the subsequent analysis. From (26) 
and (27) we have, since income effects cancel,
xkmq - mkxq = (xkmj - mkx°) - (xkm£ - mkx£) (29)
For an intuition of what the sign of this term would be, 
suppose that U(.) is weakly separable in xt+i and [xt,gt,mt ]. Then we 
have that (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980):
xv = rj xkCffk and = 77 mkCf/k (30)
where rj is a multiplier.
Using these expressions in (29), the first term drops out, leaving:
xkmq ~ mkxq = mkxr ” xkmr (31)
Recall that since mr is negative, then it must be the
case that (31) is positive (continuing to assume all goods are
normal) except in case there is a sufficiently strong degree of net 
complementarity between money and current consumption, i.e. x£ < 0 , 
g£ < 0.
If instead, U(.) is assumed to be additive, the same
conclusion about the sign of (31) holds. But here the assumption of
normality of all goods imposes the additional property that they are
all net substitutes. Consider secondly the constrained money demand
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function in (20). Exactly analogous arguments indicate that, if all 
goods are normal,
0 < (l-qt)mk < 1 (32)
while the sign of nig is uncertain: we shall, as above, illustrate with 
the usual assumption in which case it is positive. The quantity 
constrained dm/d(PyX) may be considered the outcome of income and 
substitution effects. The income effect is evidently negative, while 
the substitution effect reinforces this if money and current 
consumption are net substitutes, but counteracts it if they are net 
complements. In general, we shall assume that dm/d(Py.x) < 0 . If U(.) 
is weakly separable in xt, it is easy to show that:
Variations in X have an income effect since more of income is 
committed to the fixed expenditure, and the change in X implies a move 
to a different part of the indifference surface. Though this latter 
effect disappears with the assumption of separability, it provides a 
useful comparison, although restrictive, in that xt and mt cannot be 
net complements consistently with being normal in such a case.
(3) An Illustration with a particular utility function
A specific form of utility function of the CES type is 
now used as an example:
0m/9(PyX) = - mk (33)
p p p p 1 Ip
U l x ^ g ^ x t + ^ m t )  = [ xt^+ gt^+ mt^+ x ^  ] (34)
Since preferences are invariant with respect to a
monotonic transformation, I use:
U = I xtP+ gtP+ mtP+ XtJi ] (35)
Define c = p/(p-l) and let:
Pl=Py,t' P2=Pg,t' P3= ( 1-<It) • P4=<3tPy,t+l and p= 2i=l-4 (Pi)a (36)
The elasticity of substitution for this CES function is
given as:
where -<» < p < +1 implying -1 < &  < +<» . It follows that: 0 < a  <  +a>
since a  is nothing other than (1 + & ) .
Ii)No Rationing
When there are no constraints on individual choice in any of 
the markets, then utility as given by (35) is maximised subject to 
equation (15), and the optimal consumption demands are:
pi <r_1
xt ■ (p-J K? <37>
9t - [f2]* 1 K? <38>
* t+ i  -  [ f * r 1 ^  <39>
(mt+bt)
P4
(39)
The second equality in (39)' is due to constraint (14)
above implying that the old simply consume an amount equal to the
value of their savings since there are no bequests. Note that money
does not earn any interest, and therefore, rules out a term such as
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(l+rt)mt in the expression for total savings of the individual, 
mt - [-f3-]* 1 Kg (40)
and,
1 = 1 r KdlP" 1t-frp
The multiplier 5 is the multiplier associated with the 
individual budget constraint, and is interpreted as the marginal 
utility of income.
Suppose we now consider the special case of a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function where a  = 0. Then the demand for each 
of the goods is given as:
Py,txt = Pg,t9t = <3tPy,t+l)xt+l = (l-qt )mt = -i- K<*t <42)
4
But from the last two inequalities of (42) above, and 
using the consumption equation of the old of generation t given in 
(2 1 ), we have:
qt (mt+ bt ) = Py,t+1 xt+l = - ± -  K t (43)
4
Equation (43) implies a demand for bonds of:
bt = U ________ l____1 - ^ t  (44)
U t (i - qt)J 4
This bond demand function indicates, importantly, the 
absence of any negative net wealth effects in that total income 
increases with a rising bond stock. Also, we observe that bond demand 
varies inversely with q^, as one would expect, since q^ . is the unit 
price at which the government sells bonds.
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(ii) Consumption Demand Constraints
Next, considering the case when the young consumer's 
demand for Y is rationed to X, say, the changes in optimal consumption 
demands (37) to (40), and in (41) are:
xt - X (45)
and a different income term, Kd*, as in equation (19) above:
\
Kd* = Kd - pyX (46)
Kd* is substituted for Kd as the new "income" term, and the expression 
for P in the demand rationing situation changes to:
E = P2(T + P3a + P4(T < p (47>
It is immediately clear that changes in py have only an 
income effect on demand and no substitution effects. Similarly, it is 
easily established that the marginal utility of income, denoted by 5, 
falls. This is intuitively clear since it merely indicates the fact 
that the consumer can no longer achieve his desired consumption with 
his earnings, reflecting the decline in the marginal utility of 
income from i to {.
(iii) Constraints on Labour Supply
The effects of labour supply rationing to some level, 1, 
in the private firm is the reduction of income to Kd,#, as mentioned 
earlier in equation (18). Here, we have both income and substitution
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effects if there are price changes in Y. Obviously, changes in the 
constraint level 1 generate income effects on consumption demands.
Lastly, a little bit of detail on the role of money and 
expectations before studying the nature of the short-run equilibrium 
to be covered in the next chapter.
(4) Money and Expectations
Since there are no credit markets and no form of assets 
other than money and government bonds, the supply of money is from the 
old of generation t-1 , and the expansion of money supply to balance 
the government revenue constraint.
For analytical simplicity, I assume rational 
expectations. However, different assumptions on expectations and 
price formation have significantly different effects on output and 
employment (Benassy,1986). Given our assumptions that the old do not 
work, future wages and labour market conditions are not relevant, and 
it is not necessary to form expectations on them. The government 
produced good is consumed only by the young, ruling out the need for 
anticipating their future prices. Hence, the important element here 
is the expected future price of Y, Py,t+1 ' -^n respect of which
consumers are assumed to hold rational expectations.
This completes the discussion of the individual economic 
agents of our model, and their behaviour in different economic 
environments. The nature of the short-run equilibrium, and the 
corresponding policy prescriptions are studied, regime by regime, in 
the chapter to follow.
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Chapter 3
Short-run Equilibrium and Policy 
(3.11 Principal Findings
Here we show that the public sector provides a viable control 
measure not only in the Keynesian unemployment regime but also in 
situations of Classical unemployment. Depending on the consumption 
demand relations, and the importance of the state owned enterprises 
in the economy, private production and employment decisions can be 
quite effectively influenced by the choice of public sector prices. A 
rigorous analysis of this, and other results is the subject of this 
chapter.
Our principal results on policy changes indicate that:
1) Changes in taxes are not necessarily contractionary. This 
unconventional result follows from the fact that money and commodity 
demands are determined by the level of disposable income and not by 
gross income. As a consequence, taxes have both a contractionary and 
an expansionary impact, leading to amgibuity in their final effect. 
But if "too high a degree of complementarity between money and current 
consumption” is ruled out, then a policy of tax cuts is expansionary 
for the most commonly assumed demand responses.
2) In the current model, aggregate income is determined by the
value of private sector output and total labour incomes in the public
sector. This fact leads to some interesting results with respect to
the effect of changes in public sector prices, as a policy instrument,
to influence private and public sector production and employment
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levels in the two sectors and hence, aggregate income and employment 
in the economy. Typically, a lower price for the public sector good, 
for instance, leads to a corresponding increase in its demand and 
therefore, an increase in labour income in the public sector. However, 
the effects on the demand for the other goods, money and the privately 
supplied good, also require to be taken account of to assess the 
overall macroeconomic consequences of the price change. In the 
analysis that follows, a detailed investigation of the conditions 
under which a price change would be expansionary is spelt out.
3) Even in the context of a situation characterised by "Classical" 
unemployment, where the traditional instruments of government fiscal 
policy are ineffective, it is verified that changes in public sector 
price may well proove effective in reducing the rate of unemployment.
The framework of the analysis used in deriving these results 
remains the same as in the previous chapter. The prices, py and w, are 
fixed exogenously. But qt is assumed to be determined in the money 
market as equating money supply and demand. The policy or control 
variables assumed throughout our paper are the level of government 
spending Z, lump-sum taxes T, public sector prices pg, changes in the 
money supply Mt and bond stocks Bt - any four of which may be chosen 
independently. Assuming Z and pg are always chosen independently, 
leaves us with the following policy instruments, or financing 
mechanisms:
Tax financing, Mt and Bt constant 
Money financing, Tt and B{- constant 
Bond financing, Tt and Mt constant
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The policy framework used here, in the first instance, is in 
the context of bond-financing i.e., treating M^, Tt, Zt and Pg,t as 
exogeneously determined control variables, while Bt is implicitly 
determined by the government budget constraint, equation (1 0 ), chapter 
2 above. With a population stationary in size, the market clearing 
conditions and the corresponding set of equilibria Y, ly and q for the 
three disequilibrium regimes discussed earlier are analysed below, 
following a brief description of the Walrasian equilibrium.
(3.2) Walrasian Equilibrium
The Walrasian equilibrium is described by the set of prices 
(Po'wo'3o) at which all 3 markets viz. the private product, labour and 
money markets clear simultaneously. The equilibrium conditions are:
1 (w0 /p0) = l0^y (1 )
*o,y + *d,g = &  (2 )
Equation (1) indicates that private sector labour 
demand is determined solely by the Walrasian real wage, w0 /p0, while 
(2 ) implies that l0,y i-8 exactly equal to the available labour supply, 
L-l^g. Equations (3) and (4) below indicate that in both the private 
product and money markets, demand exactly matches supply at the 
Walrasian interest rate, q ^  and real wage, w0 /p0.
f[f'-l(w0 /p0 )] = Y0 = x| + x^ - 1 + Zt (3)
m = m(K0 ,q0 ,p0 ,w0 ,pg) (4)
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where Pg is a policy variable, and
Yo “ ^ ^ o fy)
K0 = PoYo ^ w—
= aggregate income
To sum up, equations (l)-(4) describe the Walrasian
equilibrium in terms of the interest rate, q ^  and real wage, w0 /p0. 
Note that the assumption of an exogenous labour supply, absence of 
disutility of labour, an independently determined public sector price 
pg as a government policy variable and rational expectations on Py,t+1 
result in the Walrasian real wage and output, Y0, being endogenously 
determined.
(3.3) Kevnesian Unemployment Equilibrium
In this regime, private product price, py and wages, w, are 
fixed exogenously, and moreover at levels at which there is excess
supply in both the labour and private product markets. The
equilibrium (Y,ly) are determined by the short side of the market, 
while qt equates money demand and supply. Therefore, Y, ly and q, are
given as a solution to (5), (6 ) and (7) below:
Yk,t * xl + xl_1 + zt (5)
xy,t = (Yk,t> (6)
Mt * m I KSc,t'<3t'Pt] (7)
For the general utility function (12) assumed in chapter 2
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and the corresponding set of optimal demands, we rewrite the private 
product market clearing equation above as:
Yk,t = +  z t (5)'
where
x| = xfKj^t'^t'Pt] by equation (16.1), chapter 2
+ bt_^)/Pi by equation (2 1 ), chapter 2 
At s (bt-i + mt.iJ/p!
= x + wfl^ + lg)~T by equation (18), chapter 2 
= total disposable income in the K.U. regime 
l_k * constraint on labour supply in K.U. regime 
Pt 58 Pl'P2'Py,t+l
From equation (5)', we see that the level of employment does 
not appear independently in the consumption demand. This is due to 
our assumptions that labour has no disutility, the old do not work and 
consume out of their savings, and that all profits are redistributed 
immediately. Therefore, equations (5)' and (6 ) can be solved 
recursively for the equilibrium level of output and employment in the 
private firms.
We now consider the overall effects of policy variable 
changes in the product and money markets, depicting the goods and 
money market equations in terms of the traditional "IS-LM" diagram, 
Fig.l below, where (Y*q) are the endogenous variables. The 
translation of our earlier analysis into this framework is to 
establish a synthesis with the earlier generation of Keynesian models 
of the IS-LM type, as in Rankin (1984) and Benassy (1986) to cite some 
of the previous authors.
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Fig. 1
From the earlier discussion on the properties of the
consumption demand functions, x^ ., m^, etc., the slopes of the two
curves are established. For illustrative purposes, I consider the 
particular case when public sector production is characterised by 
constant returns to scale i.e, 6 = 1  when lg = G (see equation 8 , 
chapter 2). Recalling the definition of disposable income as = PyYk 
+ wig -T, and using the demand function for G, (see equation (16.2) in 
chapter 2 ), we obtain an expression for as an implicit function of 
the variables (Y,q):
Kic = PyYk + w g(K£'<i/P)-T = k [Yk'g''ik'T'P] <8)
where Ky = dK/dY > 0 and Kq > 0, (9)
and we continue to assume Py,w as exogenous, rational expectations on 
p®,t+1 f an<* Pg a given policy parameter. Therefore, the product and 
money market equations (5) and (7) may now be rewritten in terms of 
the endogenous variables (Y,q) as:
Yk = x[Kg(Yk,q;p,lk),q;p] + A + Z
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(10)
and,
M = m[Kj*(Yk,q;p,lk),q;p] (11)
Making use of the income derivatives Ky and Kq in (9), and 
the properties of the demand functions, we obtain:
dYk = (xkKy)dYk + (xkKq)dq + (xq)dq (12)
so that 0Yk/8q > 0, establishing a negatively sloped IS. The
mechanism underlying this response is the fact that Xq is positive 
because of the savings effect of a decline in the interest rate (see 
pages 19, 20, chapter 2) and also because Kq is positive as seen
earlier in (9) since gq > 0 and all consumption demands are normal, by 
assumption.
Similarly, from the money market equilibrium condition and 
using the properties of K^, and of the money demand function, we 
derive:
(mkKy)dYk + (mkKq)dq + (mq)dq = 0  (13)
indicating a positively sloped LM.
At this point, it has to be pointed out that alternative 
assumptions on the technology in public sector production of 8  ^ 1
would lead to a different response in product demand to changes in the 
interest rate and hence, a correspondingly different slope of the IS 
or LM curves. Also, I draw attention to the special case of the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function when both Xq and gq are zero, resulting 
in the supply of the privately produced good, Y, being invariant to
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changes in the interest rate, and the IS curve in (12) is vertical. 
But the LM curve continues to be positively sloped since the price of 
money is (1-q). I have suppressed the bond market equation by Walras 
Law. As shown earlier in chapter 2 with the specific example of a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function, it is easily verified here as well that 
there is a similar direct relationship between the bond stock and 
aggregate income, K, and the absence of a negative net wealth effect.
(3.4) Policy variable changes in the Keynesian regime
The comparative statics differ from the usual results in some 
important respects: though an increase in Z and M, for instance, lead 
to rightward shifts in the IS and LM curves respectively, more 
detailed analysis of the policy variable changes in T, Z and Pg reveal 
some notable differences. Also, it is important to bear in mind that 
the comparative static results derived below are seen as holding at a 
given point of time t for fixed level of bond stock, Bt_i. This is so 
because an equilibrium (<3t,Yt) indicates a corresponding value of bond 
stock, Bt, and since there is no presumption that Bt equals Bt_j^ this
in turn, implies that the IS will be shifting over time.
(i) An increased government demand for private output
From the government budget constraint, equation (10) in 
chapter 2, a rise in government expenditures Z, for example, will 
affect Bt and hence, both aggregate income and interest q in the next 
equation. With respect to the changes in the level of private sector 
production, we derive that increased government demand is expansionary 
as shown below. For the utility and production funcions assumed here, 
we obtain by totally differentiating (1 0 ) and (1 1 ) the effects of
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increased government spending Z on private sector production in (14) 
below, and hence, on aggregate income since changes in private sector 
output and total income are directly related.
Jfr = tmkKq + mql (14)
d z  H  ' '
where H = determinant of AD+BC > 0, since A,B,C and D are defined as 
in equations (14)' below:
A = (1-x^Ky) = 1- marginal propensity to consume Y
B = (xkKq + xq) >0
C = m^Ky * marginal propensity to demand money
D = (mkKg + mq) >0
(14)'
As argued earler, B and D, are the composite effect of 
changes in the interest rate, q, on commodity and money demand, 
repectively and are both positive since xjc,mjc,Xq and mg > 0. The 
numerator of (14) is nothing but D, and denotes the total effect of 
interest rate changes on money demand, comprising the income effect, 
m^Kg, and substitution effect, mg, the latter term being positive (see 
equations (24)-(28), chapter 2). Since all goods are assumed normal, 
money demand increases/decreases with income (equation (23), chapter
2) so that m^ > 0. With reference to the response of aggregate 
income, Ky or Kg, we consider the particular case where total income K 
is defined as in (8 ) above. Therefore, m^Kg + mg is positive, and by 
earlier analysis, the sign of the denominator determinant H is 
positive so that dY/dz > 0, establishing that increases in government 
expenditures Z stimulate private production. Note, however, that the 
multiplier (14) is smaller than the "simple" Keynesian multiplier of 
l/fl-Xk), as a result of the presence of financial assets competing 
with current consumption of goods.
As a corollary, we conclude that steping up government demand
has expansionary effects on aggregate income since increases in
45
private sector production lead to an increase in aggregate income. As 
an illustration, I consider the particular case of the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function, and constant returns to scale production function in 
public sector production.
An example
Writing a  f o r  the proportion of income spent on X, /3 for the 
proportion spent on public output, and y f°r t*1® proportion held in 
money, and setting A * Zt + (B^-i+Mt-i)/Pir the key equations of the 
model are:
PlY = p^A + aKd 
Kd = PlY + (w/pg)0Kd - T 
M = 7 Kd/(l-q)
SO,
Kd [l- a  - (w/pg )0] -PiA - T 
The multiplier is:
9Kd/3z = l/{l - ja+(w/pg)f?]}
If a  = 0 = 1/4, the multiplier is
3Kd/9z = 1/[1 - l/4(l+w/pg)] 
and for public sector pricing at marginal cost, we have:
0Kd/3z =2, and for Pg=.5w, the multiplier is 4.
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
46
(illChanges in lump-sum taxes
Unlike the standard text-book results, we observe ambiguity 
in the effects of tax changes. This is because taxes have a dual 
effect insofar as they have both a contractionary and an expansionary 
impact on private sector production Y, given that money and commodity 
demands are a function os disposable income and not of gross income in 
our model. The result of a change in lump-sum taxes, T, on private 
firm output Y is given by:
0Y _ [ED - PB]
3t~  H  (15)
where B and D continue to be defined as in (14)' while E and F are:
E = xj'.krp < 0 
F = m^k-p < 0
since mjc,xjc >0 by assumption of normality, and KT = -1 simply follows 
from the definition of disposable income as in equation (8 ) above. 
Hence, we may express:
E = — (1—A) and 
F = - C
so that:
3X [ED - FB] _ -[(l-A)D -CB] ,,,,,
3t ~ '  H---- "--- H------  (15)
Now, (1—A) is nothing other than x^Ky = x^, the marginal
propensity to consume the private good Y since Ky =1 follows from the
definition of aggregate income K. For the tax multiplier to be 
negative, we need that (l-A)D - CB > 0. It is not obvious that this 
will be the case unless we rule out, as discussed in equation (31), 
chapter 2 , too high a degree of complementarity between money and
current consumption. We are then able to claim unequivocally, for the
most commonly assumed demand responses, that 3y /9t<0: a decrease in 
lump-sum taxes stimulates private production, the opposite being the 
case for increased taxation.
(iii) Balanced Budget Multiplier
The "balanced budget multiplier" is usually less than unity.
However, our analysis yields a multiplier of exactly 1, a result due
to the absence of an investment demand function in our model. Adding 
equations (14) and (15)' above results in:
0Y + 0Y _ D ( [ED - FB]
0T <3z H H
= D(l+E) - FB [AD + BC] , /1Cv
H  H " -----H  ~ 1 (16)
since as indicated earlier, (1+E) = A and F = - C. However, the
presence of an interest sensitive investment function would modify the 
government spending multiplier, dY/dZ; the value of the matrix H would 
be different since it would then include the additional influence of 
interest rate changes on investment, and hence, dampen the expansion 
in income, Y .
An important feature to note is that results (i) and (iii) 
are wholly independent of particular parameter values.
(iv) Changes in the price of the public sector good
The specific questions posed in this chapter are - What would 
be the effect of changes in public sector prices on aggregate income? 
In section (i), I gave an example with a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
and CRS in public sector production, where we found that lowering of
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the public sector price from Pg=w to pg=.5w brought about an increase 
in the value of the multiplier 0K^/8z. In the general case, would it 
be expansionary to drop price? and if so under what conditions would 
this be true? How is private production affected by a price change Pg? 
The subject of "optimal" public sector pricing, its relation to 
marginal cost and related issues is deferred to Chapter 5.
In order to answer this and related questions, it is useful 
first to derive the effect on privately supplied output, Y:
3y _ [ED - FB]
3 ^ ------H---- (17)
The expression for E and F is different now, reflecting the effects of 
changes in pg on consumption and money demand:
E = xkKp/g + xp,g <18>
F = m^Kp^g + mp,g (18)'
Once again, as we might expect, there are both income, 
XfcKpyg and mkKp^g, and substitution, xp^g and mp,g/ effects on 
commodity and money demands respectively, where Kp^g s Kg9p,g < 8
since Kg > 0 and 9p,g < 0 i.e. negative own-price effect of G. 
Therefore, normality of demands implies both xkkp^g <0 and mkkp^g <0, 
following a decline in K via the higher p g ,  as in this instance. The 
terms Xp^g and mp,g in E and F (equations (18) and (18)') respectively 
depend on whether x and m are complements or substitutes with g, in 
the former situation re-inforcing the income effects, or 
counter-acting it in the case of substitutes. Three possibilities are
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envisaged, as detailed below:
a) x and g are net substitutes while m and g are net complements:
E >0
F <0, then ED - FB>0 and hence, 0 Y / 0 p g  > 0
b) alternatively, x and g are net complements with m and g as net 
substitutes in which event,
E <0, and F >0, resulting in 0 Y / 0 p g  <0.
The intuition for (a) and (b) is straight-forward - since 
production of Y is demand determined, any changes in demand for x as 
in this case via changes in pg# call for corresponding adjustments in 
production levels of Y.
(c) Lastly, if:
(i) E,F > 0
or,
(ii) E,F < 0
then the sign of ED - FB is uncertain. However, (i) is ruled out
since it implies that both x and m are complements with 6 , but by
homogenity requirements: £^ = 0 si,j = 0 / implying that all goods cannot 
be complements. The ambiguity, therefore, reduces to only case (ii) of 
both x and m being substitutes for G, in which event further 
assumptions about the relative magnitudes of each term are required to 
sign the effects of changes in public sector prices on the privately
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produced output.
Returning to the question posed at the outset about the 
effects on aggregate income, we recall the definition of aggregate 
income K as: K =PyY +wlg(G). With reference to the effects on the
public sector, an increase in price would lead to a fall in the demand 
for G, the publicly supplied good, and hence, in labour demand lg and 
total wage income in the public sector, wig. However, as seen in the 
analysis above the effects on private output Y depends on the demand 
relations between the goods Y, G and money. If the demand relations 
are as analysed in case a) then dY/8pg is expansionary, and we do not 
have an unambiguous answer as to the multiplier effects on aggregate 
income K and total employment since there is the countervailing effect 
of a lower wage income in the public sector. Only if the expansionary 
effect on Y outweighs the effect of reduced employment and income in 
the public enterprise, could a higher price in the public sector be 
considered to have an expansionary impact on the economy. On the 
other hand, in case b) when a decline in public sector price leads to 
an increased demand for both Y and G, then unequivocally, a lower 
price pg would lead to a higher level of aggregate income whilst a 
price increase in such a situation would be contractionary.
I go back to the particular case (see section (i)) of the
Cobb-Douglas utility function, and constant returns to scale in the
production of G, where it is readily verified that a rise in the 
public sector price reduces the value of the multiplier through a fall 
in G/K. Also, it was shown taking particular values of Pg that a
lowering of price resulted in higher aggregate income.
To summarize the comparative statics, changes in tax or
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public sector prices have both contractionary and expansionary effects 
on consumption demands, resulting in ambiguity in the behaviour of 
private sector production. The economy-wide effects of changes in 
public sector prices on aggregate income and level of employment are 
dependent on the relative significance of the two sectors, and the 
structure of demand relations. However, under quite plausible and 
fairly commonly assumed demand responses, something definite can be 
said about the effects of changes in public sector prices and taxes on 
private production. On the other hand, the effects of increased 
government spending is unambiguously expansionary, and quite 
independent of any particular parameterisation.
(3.5) Classical Unemployment
The private firm's Walrasian product supply and labour demand 
now determine output and employment in the private sectors
^c,y “ ^ ' ^(Wt/Py,t) (19)
as in equation (2 .1 ), chapter 2
and,
(20)
as in equation (2 .2 ), chapter 2
Mt - m[K<3\qt;pt ] (21)
where,
Kg = Pt,t^C * wt^f^c '^t'PtJ — Py,tx* —^t
= disposable income net of expenditures on the
rationed good, x*. (See equation (19), chapter 2)
x* = the ration amount of Y, obtained from the
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income-expenditure identity as x* = Yc-At-1*
The income derivatives are 0k£/9y > 0 and 3K^/8q > 0.
Clearly, by (19) and (20), output and employment are solely 
determined by the exogenous real wage, and independent of any demand 
management policies, resulting in the vertical IS as depicted in 
Fig.2. Using the properties of income, K^, and of the money demand
function above, we obtain an upward sloping LM, as shown in Fig.2.
L  M
L M
Fig. 2
(3.6) Policy changes in the CU regime
The government budgetary measures on G or T are ineffective 
in influencing the level of output and labour input in the private 
sector. It is possible, though, that changes in pg influence the net 
excess supply of labour: an increased product demand for 6 , for
example, implies higher employment in the government sector with 
labour demand in the private sector unchanged since the real wage 
remains invariant with respect to changes in public sector prices. 
This point is illustrated below using once again the specific example 
of a Cobb-Douglas utility function, and a constant returns to scale 
production function in the public sector:
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An Example
Private output is determined by the real wage, and that
available to the first generation is, in terms of expenditure, 
(PyY-A). This implies that the 'surplus' to be spent on the public 
sector good, money and future consumption, is K-(pyY-A) = A-T + wig. 
It follows that the demand for the publicly produced good is:
pg° = 7 1 ^ 7  <A_T+Wlg> <22>
and the demand for money is:
(l-q)M = 7 (ft-T+wlg) (22)'
where a, (3 and y are t^e proportions of income spent on the private 
good Y, public good G and money respectively. From the first of the 
two equations above,
PqG [ 1 ---“ —  1 = "C IA “ T 1 (23>L (1-a) Pg J (l~o)
i
Equation (23) indicates that a fall in the public sector 
price raises G, and hence, both employment and total private sector 
income, confirming the results noted in the general case. However,
limits to the extent to which Pg can be varied to generate a larger
volume of employment, in any given period, is set by the available 
residual income k£* since x* and Py are both pre-determined by 
assumption. Furthermore, the increased aggregate incomes could well 
exacerbate the net excess demand for the privately produced good in 
the subsequent period, resulting in inflationary effects, a perhaps 
unavoidable cost of a lower rate of unemployment.
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(3.7)Repressed Inflation
Private sector output and employment are now both supply 
determined so that
ly,r « L -lg (24)
Yr = y ^ r )  = xg) <25>
where the upper bar y indicates labour 
constrained output
The money market clearing equation is represented by:
Mt = m[Kg(Yr/q;X),q;p] (26)
where,
k£ = v  + wL -pyX - T = k[Yr,q;X]
= disposable income net of spending on X?
the rationed amount of Y.
Fig. 3
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Given the excess demand for labour, there is full employment, 
and private firm production is at a higher level of output than in the 
Classical Unemployment regime. This is because in the latter case, 
real wage configuration is such that (w/py )c > (w/py )R i.e., real 
wages are higher in the Classical regime, accounting for the net 
excess supply of labour, than in the Repressed Inflation case, 
characterised by an excess demand for labour (and goods). Assuming 
constant returns to scale in public sector production, equation (25) 
is totally differentiated to obtain:
dYr = f'(L-G)[-GkKydYr - (gkKq+gq )dq]
or,
dYr/dq = - f'Gq/[l+f'GkKyj < 0 (27)
implying an upward sloping IS curve. The intuition for this follows 
from the assumption that the labour supply available to the private 
sector is net of the labour demand in the public sector which 
increases with an increase in the demand G. By assumption, since the 
consumption of the government supplied good increases with an increase 
in q: gq>0, it follows that output and labour demand, lq, in the
public sector exhibits a corresponding rise. This, in turn, results in 
a reduced availability of labour for the private firm since ly=L-lq, 
and hence, a smaller volume of private sector output, Yr.
' The case of a stable RI equilibrium is depicted in Fig.3. It
is readily verified that the LM curve has a positive slope as shown.
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(3.8) Regime Classification
We now classify the regimes in terms of the real wage, 
a>t=wt/py^t, and wealth, E Mt-1 + Bt-1' illustrating for the
production and utility functions assumed here. The choice of the two 
variables, real wage and wealth, to depict the regime configuration is 
guided by two factors:
a) The level of wealth in the economy is determined by the 
operations of the government to finance its budget since both bond 
issue and money creation is determined solely by the government. 
Therefore, the level of wealth A is a public policy instrument which 
can be used to influence aggregate income and employment.
b) Real wages seems the natural choice since it enables comparison 
with the policy results of earlier authors like Malinvaud, and others.
On the C-R boundary, and continuing to assume CRS in the 
production of G, it must be true that:
f'[L-Gt] = (wt/py/t)0 (28)
and it follows that the C-R boundary is invariant with respect to the 
level of wealth A^.^ as shown in Fig.4.
On the R-K boundary, (assuming 6 - 1 i.e. constant returns 
to scale in the production of the publicly supplied good G) the goods 
and money market equations are:
f(L-Gt) - xt [Kr/t,<It,Pt 1 + At-1 + zt
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(29)
and,
**t = m [Kr,t'<Jt'Ptl (30)
Private firm output is at its maximum, and equal to aggregate 
demand on the K-R. Also note that does not enter (30) since only
the young demand money to provide for their non-working second period, 
and it is easily established that K-R has a negative slope with 
intercept given by the wealth level of the old, In this result,
I have assumed that an increase in real wage, o>tswt/py,t' leads to an
increase in aggregate income so that is positive. However, this 
need not necessarily be the case since, as mentioned earlier, while an 
increase in real wage increases labour income in the public sector, it 
brings about simultaneously a reduction in employment levels and 
income in the private firm. The rest of the analysis maintains this 
assumption of K^X) purely for ease of exposition. Totally 
differentiating (29), we have:
dWt/dAt.! = - 1/If'GfcKu + x ^ ]  (31)
Finally, with respect to the K-C boundary, the two market 
equilibrium conditions are:
f[f ^(w^./py^^) — xt(^k,t,(5t'Pt 1 ^t—1 ^t (32)
and,
Mt = m IKk,t'(It'Pt3 (33)
where Y= h(w/py), h'<0, is substituted for Y in aggregate income 
since the economy is now on the border of the Classical and Keynesian 
regimes. Once again note that At_i does not appear in the money 
market equation for the reasons mentioned earlier. Totally
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differentiating (32), we obtain:
[h'(^ t) “ XkKwl^t = ^t-l (34>
so that the K-C boundary is downward sloping.
Putting together the three different boundaries discussed 
above, we have the regime configuration of Fig.4 below.
CO
Fig. 4
(3.9) Conclusions
By enlarging its activities to include the production of 
f goods for private consumption, the government has a new and effective 
\ tool in its public sector pricing policy. The traditional measures for 
Keynesian unemployment are increased government expenditures and a 
reduction of taxes, which have been discussed here, and found to 
conform, by and large, to the standard text-book analysis. But the 
novel element, worth noting in this treatment of government policy 
measures, is the choice of public sector prices. The nature of the
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underlying demand relationships plays a key role in policy decisions 
of what constitutes an appropriate public sector price: if the goods 
relate as in case (a) above where the privately and publicly supplied 
goods, Y and G respectively, are net substitutes while money and G are 
net complements, then Pg is to be raised. On the other hand, in a 
situation described by (b), where Y and G are net complements while 
money and G are net substitutes, then the policy prescription is to 
lower pg, the public sector price.
Even in this relatively simplistic diagram, Fig.4, some of 
the results obtained are rather similar in essence to the results of 
Malinvaud (1977). In terms of policy recommendations, the solution in 
the Keynesian regime is, unequivocally, increased aggregate demand via 
increases in A or an appropriately chosen public sector pricing 
policy, whilst for a wage-price configuration resulting in Classical 
Unemployment the key lies in wage regulation. A larger volume of 
employment follows a lower wage (and vice-versa) as depicted by a move 
towards W , the Walrasian equilibrium. On the other hand, the Keynesian 
market equilibrium equations indicate that higher levels of wealth 
increase aggregate demand and hence, generate larger total labour 
employment and higher aggregate incomes. The absence of a labour 
supply function in this version of the model would appear to curtail 
the role of wage manipulataion as a policy measure to buoy aggregate 
demand in the K.U. situation. But relaxing our initial labour supply 
assumptions to allow for labour/leisure decisions as household choice 
variables does not alter the message so far. Only, we would have 
built up an explicit argument, as in Malinvaud (1977) and Benassy 
(1984), for an increase in wages.
In a situation of Classical Unemployment, where the
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traditional budgetary measures bearing on government spending Z or 
taxes T fail to influence private sector output Y and employment, the 
presence of public sector production and a suitable pricing policy may 
well prove effective in curtailing, to some extent, the excess supply 
of labour. Through induced changes in the level of employment for 
public sector production via its product price changes, the government 
enterprise can potentially reduce the overall rate of unemployment in 
the economy.
To sum up, the upshot of this analysis is that introduction 
of public sector production provides an additional fiscal policy tool 
to administer aggregate demand and employment, which is quite besides 
the existing instruments of government spending and taxation. In 
particular with respect to Classical unemployment, it is commonplace 
that public spending and taxes are ineffective but what we have now 
demonstrated is a potentially viable fiscal policy measure in public 
sector pricing. This aspect becomes particularly significant in the 
context of a large number of developing countries where state owned 
enterprises account for a substantial share of the gross domestic 
product.
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Chapter 4
"Does Fiscal Policy Matter? ** - the role of public sector prices
(4.1)Background
So far we may appear to have side-stepped the issue of how 
the government chooses to finance its deficit. But as mentioned 
earlier, the government has three available options which it can use 
singly or in some combination: new bond issue, taxes and printing
money. Each has its own different consequences for the economy, but 
the last two as alternative financial mechanisms have been the subject 
of extended debate and controversy. To pose the problem in its 
historical perspective, a quick overview of some of the literature is 
presented. In this chapter, I try to gain some insights into the 
effects of extending government activities to include production for 
the market, the choice of alternative public sector prices, and 
therefore, the consequences in terms of modifying the earlier results.
(4.2) Brief review of literature
Monetarists (Friedman, 1956, 1959, and others) assert the
inefficacy of bond financed fiscal policy claiming the preponderance 
of "negative net wealth effects" negating or even reversing the 
initial positive effects of increased aggregate demand. As against 
this, Blinder and Solow (abbreviated as BS) suggest that it is an 
"empirical question whether the subsequent wealth effects of 
bond-financed deficits, while less expansionary than money-financed 
deficits in the short run (Friedman's 'first round), are actually more 
expansionary in the long run." A review of the work of Blinder and
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Solow (1973),(1974) and Tobin and Buiter (1976), both of which were 
undertaken in the framework of fix price IS-LM based models, seems in 
place. But in line with most of the literature, these two studies 
confine public expenditure to activities which are termed as "waste" 
in that they do not enter the individual utility function, and also 
there is no government production for private consumption.
Suppose government spending is permanently increased from an 
initial position of budget balance. Let us refer to this change in the 
time path of government spending as the Blinder-Solow rule. Tobin and 
Buiter define a new variable "government outlay", Zt, as:
Z.t ~ Py,tzt + (l-^tJBt-l
i.e. the sum of spending and interest payments. Their rule, hereafter 
referred to as the TB rule, is to permanently increase Zt rather than 
Z{., implying that Zt is first raised and then lowered since interest 
payments increase over time under bond finance, as one would expect. 
If a Steady State is to be achieved starting from an arbitrary initial 
point, when prices and wages are taken as fixed, a standard 
modification to the assumption of lump-sum taxes is to set T=rY, where 
r is the constant average and marginal rate of tax, as a necessary 
device to automatically close the government deficit since taxes now 
change with income changes. For the BS rule, convergence is rather 
less likely under pure bond financing than under pure money financing 
of the deficit; but given convergence, both long-run spending 
multipliers are greater than one, with the bond-financing multiplier 
exceeding the money-financing one. The money financed multiplier is 
1/T'(Y) where T(Y) is the tax function while the bond-financed 
multiplier is [1+(1+T')3b /3z ]/T'(Y). This last result, the authors
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claim, lays to rest any monetarist doubts about the efficacy of 
fiscal policy in situations where the system converges and is stable. 
The TB rule, on the other hand, generates identical long-run 
multipliers with a value of 1/r.
In the context of my model with the added dimension of public 
sector production and explicit treatment of different regimes, I now 
investigate the effects, regime by regime, of the alternative methods 
of bond- and money-financing of the government deficit. From the 
government budget constraint, equation (10), chapter 2, it is clear 
that a non-zero budget balance, taking account of the balance in 
public sector production, implies changing stocks of bonds and/or 
money. The pertinent questions to pose are: what is the likely
evolution over time of the economy and particularly, what additional 
dimensions does public sector production feature in this evolution, is 
convergence more likely under bond-financing than under 
money-financing, and if the system does converge, is the solution 
stable, and what are the likely values of the corresponding policy 
multipliers? Given the focus of this research, the area of principal 
interest is to examine how the inclusion of public sector production 
alters and extends the results of the previous authors and how it 
modifies the conclusions drawn with repect to pg, the public sector 
price.
In order to answer these, a clear elucidation of the price, 
wage and asset dynamics is a pre-requisite. The formation of 
prices/wages has to be endogenised under alternative specifications, 
and the effects of the simultaneous changes in the three variables 
studied. But for the time being, I choose to abstract from this 
degree of complexity in order to keep the analysis sufficiently simple
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to focus attention solely on the asset dynamics of a non-zero 
government budget - this is perceived as a better clue to isolating 
the effects of a changing bond/money stock on the evolution of the 
economy. Accordingly, some simplifying assumptions on price and wage 
behaviour are made in the tradition of the earlier studies by Barro 
and Grossman, Tobin and Buiter and others, both to single out the 
effects of the time-path of assets, and furthermore to render our 
results on a comparable basis with the results of the afore-mentioned 
authors. Hence for the purposes of the current research, fixed prices 
are assumed but it is planned, as a topic for future work, to allow 
for more realism by incorporating endogenous price formation.
It is useful that we start by considering the static 
equilibrium equations and the government budget constraint under both 
the TB and BS definitions. Our results indicate that:
a) with bond-financing under the TB rule, the BS and the TB 
multipliers are simply special cases of our value of the multiplier 
when the public sector prices its output at marginal cost.
b) the convergence and stability results of the earlier authors are 
modified; with public sector production as an additional feature, it 
is not certain even under money financing that the above results hold 
unambiguously since the choice of prices by the public sector now 
plays a crucial role.
c) it is no longer clear as to whether "the long-run multiplier for 
bond-financed deficit spending exceeds that for money-financed deficit 
spending" as in Blinder-Solow; while money-financed government 
spending is unequivocally expansionary, the effects of bond-financed
public debt on private output is ambiguous.
d) the multiplier effects are smaller since there are now other 
competing demands.
(4.3) )K,U.Regime
Pure Bond Financing
(4.3.1) Tobin-Buiter definition of the Government budget
Following the convention, we set taxes proportional to 
aggregate income K in order to close the system, so that T = rK. As a 
social security measure for the old, interest incomes on bonds, B, are 
assumed to be tax exempt.
The static equilibrium equations are defined by (2), (3) and 
(4), respectively the private national income, the "public" national 
income and money market equilibrium equations. The budget balance 
requirement under the TB rule with Z defined as in equation (1), in a 
regime of pure bond financing, is (5) below:
Yt = x IKt'^t' Ptl + Mt-1 + Bt-1 + zt (2)
where = (l-7)[py^ Y t + wt^g,tl -^s aggregate disposable 
income (see equation (13), chapter 2) 
and pt = vector of prices (py/t,wt,pg/t) with (py/t,wt) 
fixed and pg a policy variable.
xg,t = Gt = 9[Kt/<3t'* Ptl
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(3)
Mt = m[Kt,qt; pt ] (4)
^Bt-1 “ [-2-t " (Pg,t-wt)Gt “ TKtl/<It (5)
In equation (3), we have considered the particular case of
6 = 1  i.e. constant returns to scale in public sector production (see 
chapter 2). Purely for expositional ease, this simplification is 
maintained through the rest of this chapter. The symbol A denotes the 
forward difference of a variable, for instance = Yt-Yt-1* Note
that (5) is a first-order difference equation describing the time path 
of bond stocks, driving the economy from one instantaneous equilibrium 
to another.
or are modified in the context of the current model, it is necessary 
to determine:
a) the equivalent multipliers for this model, and
b) also the stability properties since long-run multipliers are of 
interest only if the system under consideration is itself not 
unstable.
For a given level of government expenditure, Z, an increase 
in bonds, unaccompanied by an increase in money supply, leads to an 
increase in the interest rate as verified below:
In order to examine if the BS or TB results continue to hold
With this aim in mind, we derive 0Yt/3Bt_i and 3qt/3Bt_i#
qttmkKyCL-r) ]
D
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(6)
where
Drawing on our earlier assumptions on demand responses (see 
equations (22)-(33), chapter 2), the terms Xq, Mg > 0 are the total 
effect of interest rate changes on commodity and money demands, 
defined respectively as:
Xq = (1-7 )xjcKq + Xq and
Gq = (l-T^kKq + 9g
Therefore, the determinant 
9(!/<It)/^Bt-l>G' confirming 
increasing bond stock.
As mentioned earlier, the effects of an increase in bond 
stock on private sector output has been the subject of debate, and the 
arguments are principally that:
a) The higher interest rates result in a cut in interest sensitive 
private expenditures, and hence a lowering of the traditional
multiplier of 1/(1-marginal propensity to spend). There is little, if
any, controversy on this aspect.
b) What is at issue, however, is the strength of the "wealth 
effects". Friedman and other monetarists held the view that these 
wealth effects are sufficiently large to offset or even reverse the 
initial expansionary effects of a government spending program through 
an increased demand for real money balances jacking up the initial 
first round rise in interest rates even further. As is now quite well 
recognised and rather widely accepted, the extent of these negative
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Mq = (l-r)mkKq + mq (6)"
D > 0 and hence, 9qt/3Bt-l <0 or 
the rise in interest rate with an
net wealth effects is a matter for empirical resolution (Blinder and 
Solow, Tobin and Buiter, Turnovsky and others).
In the context of our model, we derive:
= St9|t—  !?a > o (7)
The second term in D as in (6) • above contains 
(pyXq+Bt_i)/Mq. The increase in the interest rate leads to a decline 
in both the private product and money demands, since Xq and Mq are 
positive. But as against this, the consumption demand of the old for 
the privately produced good, Y, increases to the full extent of the
increase in bond issue, Bt_^/ since there are no bequests and gt-^t =
0 by assumption. This expansion in the consumption demand of the
elderly compensates for the reduced consumption of the young, and the
net effect is increased total demand for the private firm's output 
which is demand determined in the Keynesian Unemployment regime.
A further reason for the unambiguous positive multiplier of 
bond financing is that wealth effects in our model are not 
contractionary. Interest incomes on bonds bought by the young accrue 
to them when old with a one-period lag. Since interest incomes of the 
old are tax exempt and there are no bequests, they fail to exert the 
possible negative effects, observed in the BS and TB models, simply 
because they do not fall into any interest-sensitive expenditure 
category.
We are now ready to investigate the stability properties of 
our model. It turns out that this model is indeed stable with the TB 
rule under bond financing. Totally differentiating (5) and making use 
of (6) and (7), the stability equation evaluated at the steady state
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is given by:
am,,., a*c „ ...
- 3 i ^ T  ' c (8)
where,
C ={(1-r)(pg-w))[gyMq-Gqmy ] + rKy [1-Kqink (1-r)/Mq ]> (8)'
Stability requires, therefore, that {.} be positive. For a 
sufficiently large rate of tax, r, the second term on the RHS of (8)' 
becomes positive. Also, by analogy of equation (31), chapter 2, we 
have gyMq-Gqmy = myG£-Gym£ which must be positive except when g£<0 
i.e., there is too high a degree of complementarity between money and 
the public sector product and since the own-price effect of money 
demand is negative, i.e. m£<0. Therefore, the bracketed term { . > is 
positive, provided public sector price is at least equated to marginal 
cost and (pg-w)> 0.
An example
An illustration using the Cobb-Douglas utility function, and 
constant returns to scale production function in the public sector 
production, introduced earlier in chapter 3, proves to be informative. 
The tax function is T=rK, and the total tax base is:
K = ____- + qBt-l +Mt-1_____  (A).
{1 - (1-T) t<*+(w/Pg)0] } ' '
Using the TB definition of government expenditure, we have:
Zt = Plzt + (I'St^t-l
so that,
az/aBt.! - - (l-ql/Pi (B)'
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and the government budget constraint gives,
qtABt-i - Z - tK + (w-pg )(l-r)(3K (C)'
writing the right hand side as *<qBt_1)( and differentiating we have
e l .  [(«-Pg)(l-T)g~T)
[1 - (1-r) (a + (3w/pg ) ]
For (pg-w)> 0, the numerator of (D) is unambiguously
negative, while the denominator is positive for sufficiently small 
values of (1-r), i.e. large r or tax rate.
(4.3.2 )Some Conclusions about the Keynesian Unemployment Regime
But if {.} above is positive, then the system is stable. This
last requirement has important economic implications for policy
making:
a) The sufficient condition for {.} to be positive is that (Pg-w)> 0, 
and a large rate of tax.
b) Suppose the required pricing is adopted, then the long-run 
multiplier becomes relevant and is derived as:
3* = ____________ i____________  m
O  Z l(l-r) (Pg-W)GkKy + TKy ] '
From the value of our multiplier, we find that the
Tobin-Buiter or the Blinder-Solow multiplier, ignoring interest
payments as a budgetary deficit, is simply a special case of (9) when
the public sector prices its output at marginal cost. Otherwise, the
multiplier effect on Y is smaller, the reason being that the initial
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increase in income is now distributed over an increased demand for the 
privately produced good as well as the other commodities.
c) Furthermore, equation (9) provides an interesting result - the 
multiplier is larger, the larger w/pq  ^ Alternatively, since the 
denominator comprises the sum of two terms: we can think of the first
term of [.] as a weighted "indirect tax" or subsidy element (l-r)[.J 
and the second term as the direct tax on income, so that {.} is a 
measure of the net composite effect of the tax structure: a weighted 
tax subsidy (1-r) (Pg-w) (.) and a direct tax element t (.). Only if 
the net effect of these two measures is positive, would an increase in 
government expenditures be unambiguously expansionary.
(4.4) Blinder-Solow definition of the government budget
The endogenous variables are (Y,q,B,lg) as before but the 
budget constraint is re-defined as:
A = [ Zt + (l“qt)Bt-l”tPg,t“wt)Gt"’TKtl/<3t (10)
It is not obvious in this case that the long-run multiplier 
is expansionary, nor is it clear that the system is stable under this 
rule. Totally differentiating (3), (4) and (10), the long-run
multiplier is derived as:
3y = q
dz { D' > (11)where,
D' = {r-My (l-r)[(B+rKq)/Mq ]-(l-q)/k+(pg-w)(l-r)[gyMq-myGq ]/Mq> (11)'
and k is defined as the short-run multiplier derived in chapter 3.
The sign of D' is ambiguous so that we cannot unequivocally
say that government spending is expansionary under the BS definition
of the bond financing of the government deficit.
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Furthermore, the stability condition is also difficult to 
ascertain since:
aiBt.i/aB,..! = -{.} (12)
in the neighbourhood of equilibrium, where {.} is nothing but the 
expression D' defined in (11)' above . Therefore, this leads to the 
conclusion that, with pure bond financing, the question of stability 
is an open one under the BS rule.
Example
As an illustration, we return to the example of the 
Cobb-Douglas case and CRS production function in the public sector 
enterprise. With Z constant rather than Z, we find that is replaced 
by:
- r „ 3y 8q
[(1 - (1-r) (a + (3w/pg)) + (1-q) + <W-Pg><1-T><3 "Sb^IJ " dBt.i
It follows that for pg = w and r small that is positive, and hence 
that it is unstable.
In the next two sections, we investigate money financing of 
the government budget constraint.
(4.5) Pure Money Financing
The economy is described by the following set of equations, 
the first three of which are similar to (2) - (4) above. But the
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government budget constraint is now different:
Yt ~ x (Kt#^t) + Mt-1 + Bt-1 + zt 
lg,t - G(Kt,qt)
Mt = m (Kt»<It)
A  Mt-1 = Zt + Bt_i + (Pg,t"wt)Gt ” TKt
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
We can assume a unique solution, and solve for the Steady
State values of Y^ ., q^, lg at the exogenous level of Z^-Z. As in the 
previous section, it is important that we investigate the stability 
properties of the system. Substituting for 0Yt/0Mt_i and 0qt/0Mt-i, 
stability of the system at the Steady State requires that:
provided public sector prices at least cover marginal cost, and the 
very likely case that (1-Xy-nty) >0, we then merely require that 
0Y^/0Mt_2 > 0. However, the possibility that (1-Xy-niy) is negative 
cannot be ruled out all together, and arises because of our use of 
single period bonds rather than perpetuities with a fixed coupon rate. 
Note also that interest payments may vary even with a fixed bond 
stock. Assuming the more likely case of (1-Xy-iriy) >0, it is
straightforward to verify that the effects on Y of a money supply 
increase is expansionary, so that we are assured of a stable 
equilibrium rule with pure money financing of the government deficit. 
Once again, we note the crucial role public sector prices play in 
meeting the stability conditions.
0AMt_l = _ 0Yt.
(17)
where
C1 * {[<Pg-w)(l-T)gy + TKy](Mq + Xq +rKg)
+ [<Pg-w)(l-r)Gq + rKq ][r + (l-r(l-xy-my)]}
(17)'
Since {.} is clearly positive under our sign assumptions, and
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Finally, with pure money financing it is important to note 
that, at the Steady State, there is no difference between the TB and 
BS definitions of the government budget constraint since _Zt=Zt when 
^Mt_2=0. Therefore, it is not necessary to carry out a separate 
analysis for each of the two definitions.
(4.6)Summary of results for the Keynesian regime
To sum up, the results here for the Keynesian regime are, to 
some extent, similar to the results of Blinder and Solow (1973) and 
that of Tobin and Buiter (1976). For a change in government spending, 
there is a convergent expansion of the economy with the TB rule for 
both methods of financing, but conditional on the public sector 
following some bounds on its product pricing. With the Blinder-Solow 
definition of the government budget, it is rather less likely that 
convergence is achieved with bond-financing, and this is irrespective 
of the choices of the public sector enterprise. In cases where the 
system does converge, the multiplier is smaller than in the earlier 
studies.
(4.7) Repressed Inflation Regime
The equilibrium equations are:
Yt = f(ly,t> “ <18>
Xg,t “ ®t “ (19>
“t “ (20)
and the government budget constraint with bond financing is:
A Bt_! = [Zt + (l-qt)Bt_! - (pgft-wt)Gt - TKtJ/qt (21)
By definition, this is a regime characterised by excess
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demand in both the labour and private product markets. The
consumption of the privately supplied good Y by the young is rationed 
to some level X, say, and is determined by the income-expenditure 
identity:
the supply of the public enterprise is demand determined, both mx B 
9®/9(PyS) and gx B 9§/9(PyX) are negative. These cross effects 
considerably complicate the final impact of a bond or money supply 
expansion on the interest rate and private sector output. An increase 
in enables increased consumption by the old at time t, but it
also implies a tightening of the consumption rations for the young or 
a smaller X* Given that gx <0, this last effect results in an 
increased demand for the government supplied good and hence, a larger 
labour demand in the public sector, leading to lower labour 
availability of labour for the private firm reducing its production 
level of Y.
dimension, confuses the story so far since the reduction of the 
consumption ration X affects the demand for money balances as well. 
Taking into account the combined increase in demand for both money 
balances and G, it is not possible to detemine whether bond financed 
public spending is expansionary or otherwise without further structure 
to the model since the expression 
for is:
Xt - Yt - Bt-1 ” Mt-1 - zt (22)
Since there is no money demand rationing, and also because
However, the presence of money demand, with its added
D (23)
76
where,
D- = Mq [1 + f'(gyKy (1-7)+gx )] - f'Gq [mkKy (l-r) + fnx ] (23)'
at the quantity constrained levels of M and G, and the sign of D" 
is ambiguous.
For similar reasons the effects of money financing is also 
uncertain. Therefore, we cannot say anything definitive in this regime 
about the stability properties of equilibrium, be it bond or money 
financed public spending.
We move on now to the Classical unemployment regime, and 
examine the effects, if any, of government policy decisions.
(4.8\Classical Unemployment
Private sector output and employment are now both solely 
determined by the exogenous real wage. Recall that Kc is the sum of 
incomes generated in the private and public firms so that: Kc =
f(w/py)+ wig. Considering the particular case of constant returns to 
scale in public sector production, lq = G = g[Kc,q;x], the demand for 
G and hence, lq, can be potentially influenced by public policy 
through bringing about the desired changes in prices and interest 
rates. From the money market market equilibrium condition and the 
government budget constraint with money financing, we derive:
-dqt—  - ----- <1+i5*>-----------  (24)
OMt^l I <Pg-«>Gq + «q)
where Mq anc| Gq are as defined in (6)'' but at the constrained
demands. For similar reasons as in the Repressed Inflation regime
3m/9(PyX)sm <0 since the Classical Unemployment regime is also
characterised by demand rationing in the private product market, and
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the sign of (24) is ambiguous.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to investigate the possible 
channel by which government fiscal policy could prove effective, 
assuming that (l+mx )>0. Provided (Pg-w) is positive, we have the very 
plausible economic situation of a monetary expansion leading to a fall 
in the interest rate. This in turn, induces a bigger demand for the 
public sector good (since gq>0) and, hence, a larger volume of 
employment in the public enterprise. But now since the real wage is 
exogenously given in this regime, by assumption, the production level 
of Y and hence, employment in the private firm remains unaffected 
throughout this monetary exercise of the government. Therefore, the 
final impact of a money supply increase is to generate higher 
aggregate employment in the economy, the sufficient condition for this 
being public sector prices that at least cover marginal cost;(pg-w)>0.
(4.9\Conclusion
The present analysis indicates that only some of the 
conclusions of the earlier authors, Blinder and Solow or Tobin and 
Buiter, can be extended to the case where government activities 
include public sector production, and to its financing of deficits 
that cover deficits incurred on its production account as well. 
Furthermore, the stability as well as multiplier effects depend on the 
choice of public sector prices. The financing mechanism considered is 
bond- or money-financing. Our results do not lend support to the 
Blinder-Solow assertion that the long-run bond financed multiplier 
exceeds the money financed multiplier.
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Chapter 5
Public Sector Prices
(5.1\Introduction
The ruling price in the private sector is self selecting, as 
it were, in that it meets the objective of maximising 
profit/revenue/sales of the private firm. But in the context of a 
public enterprise, the "optimality" of its price-setting is governed 
by somewhat more complex criteria. Much has been said and written 
about this problem since different market structures and pre-specifled 
societal objectives quite naturally suggest different rules for 
optimal public sector prices. These include marginal cost pricing and 
its various second-best extensions to considerations of equity, 
financial constraints and macroeconomic policy. Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1980) and D.Bos (1986) have an excellent discussion of these various 
models.
We can broadly classify the literature along the following 
lines. One approach assumes that the economy is competitive and 
markets clear, while the other recognises the possibility of an 
environment where prices do not reflect economic scarcity. In both 
situations, it is possible that the public sector operates under a 
budget constraint which may or may not be binding. This requirement on 
public sector production points to a departure from economic 
efficiency. In such a context, the aim of optimal pricing rules is to 
cope with this source of economic inefficiency to achieve Pareto 
Optimality in resource utilisation in an economy that is otherwise
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competitive. On the other hand, in the case where the public firm, 
faced with a budget constraint, operates in an economy with market 
imperfections and quantity rationing, the rules of pricing are rather 
different. The traditional rules of marginal cost pricing have now to 
be adapted to reflect both market imperfections as well as the 
economic inefficiency arising from a binding budget limit.
Yet another dimension that optimal pricing has attempted is 
to reflect societal judgement on income distribution in its pricing 
schedule. This may again lead to deviations from marginal cost 
pricing, with the distributional characteristics (Feldstein, 1972) 
entering the determination of prices.
To sum up, one might say that the model underlying the 
traditional marginal cost pricing rule focuses on efficiency of 
resource use in a competitive environment while the other models in 
the literature are extensions of this, and which consider other 
additional criteria as well, either singly or simultaneously, namely:
a) distributional effects
b) deficit financing implications
c) macroeconomic effects
Also, the economic environment considered was broadened to 
allow for non-competitive market settings. In the next section (5.2), 
a brief overview of some of the more important early works in this 
area is presented. This is followed in section (5.3) by a 
characterisation at the steady state of the rules of optimal public 
sector prices that takes account of macroeconomic effects, as in Dreze 
(1982, '84), in an economy that features excess supply in both the
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private product and labour markets.
(5.2) Brief Review of Select Earlier Literature
The neoclassical analysis of Boiteux (1956) considers a 
second-best model where the public sector is constrained to produce 
under a budget constraint in a competitive economy. The goal of the 
government or public authority in this setting is to achieve a Pareto 
Optimal allocation in which households maximise utility, private firms 
their profits and the public undertaking its objective function, each 
subject to its own respective constraints. The instruments at the 
government's disposal are the level of public production, prices and 
household incomes. The private and public firms produce the same 
product but with different technologies so that the choice of prices 
is applicable to both types of firms. Denoting V as the indirect 
utility function of the individual consumer, and IT, $ as the private 
and public sector profits respectively, the principal proposition for 
optimal public sector prices based on the first-order necessary 
conditions is given below:
(5.2.1) Boiteux Proposition on optimal public sector prices
At a n  i n t e r i o r  s o l u t i o n , t h e r e  e x i s t s  a m u l t i p l i e r  p  s u c h  t h a t :  
jxh_£jQhj (dnj/dp)-/Shdci)/dp] = p(dtf>/dp) (1)
where,
x = vector of 1 consumption goods with prices p 
p = (pi,...,pl)
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w = wage rate assumed fixed and treated as numeraire 
Xh = welfare weights of household h 
©hj = share of household h in profits of firm j, 113 
0*1 = share of household h in public sector profits $ 
r*1 = income of household h, defined as a share 0*1 of 
private profits plus a share /3*1 of public sector 
profits.
p = multiplier, interpreted as the shadow price of 
government net revenue
If the budget constraint on the public sector <!>> b is not 
binding so that $>b, the multiplier p = 0. Then, the optimality 
condition (1) implies public sector pricing at marginal cost, if the
marginal social utility of income X^Qvk/Qr*1) is assumed to be uniform
over all households. The derivation of this result follows from the 
fact that (1) is now rewritten as:
LhX*1 - Ijyj - (d$>/dp) = z - (d$/dp) = 0 (1*1)
since
0n/3p = y by Hotelling's lemma,
- Ijyj - z = 0 from the product market clearing equation,
and,
d<J?/dp = z when Pg = w8lz/0z
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where d<J?/dp is equal to:
d$ __ z+ (p-w8lz/8z)[Ih (8xh/8p + ) ~ ^j8yj/8p]
dp 1 - (p - w9lz/9z)Ej1Bh^xh/^r
However, when the welfare weights are not uniform, and 
distributional considerations are taken account of explicitly, then 
(1) clearly points to a departure from marginal cost pricing.
Alternatively, consider the case when the revenue constraint 
on the public sector is binding, then p>0, and we have a different 
interpretation of the optimality condition, an interpretation in terms 
of a cost-benefit rule. The left-hand side of (1) is the cost to the 
household of an increase in price, taking account of the direct costs 
as well as the indirect effects on household income via the effect of 
the price increase on both private and public sector profits. In this 
situation, condition (1) requires that the marginal costs to the 
consumer of a price change, as measured by the left-hand side of (1), 
be proportional to the marginal benefit to the public sector, d$/dp, 
where p, the shadow value of government revenue, is the factor of 
proportionality adjusted to satisfy the constraint.
To sum up, the only situation where marginal cost pricing is
justified is when distributional considerations are either ignored or 
the existing income distribution is considered satisfactory, and
additionally, only if public sector revenues carry no premium in that 
the multiplier p attached to the public budget is zero. In 
alternative circumstances, there is no clear-cut directive for
marginal cost pricing, rather the rules for optimal pricing suggest a 
cost-benefit determination of the macroeconomic effects of any price 
change.
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As mentioned earlier, the Boiteux analysis, significant and 
seminal as it is, is limited to a competitive market environment and 
it is the subsequent work of Dreze (1982, 1984) that addresses the
problem of markets not clearing and quantity rationing whilst 
deriving optimal pricing rules for the public sector. Clearly in an 
economic situtation where prices do not reflect economic scarcities 
(especially of labour, for instance, as in several countries 
currently), it becomes particularly important to devise different and 
practical rules of pricing which take account of this type of market 
imperfections. The questions to pose are: How should public sector
prices be determined? and in particular, is price to be equated to or 
set below marginal cost to stimulate market demand? and starting from 
an arbitrary initial point, what are the directions of welfare 
improving price changes? The next section presents a brief description 
of the salient features of the way in which Dreze tackles these
issues.
(5.2.2) The Dreze Proposition
Dreze (1982, 1984) makes a significant departure from the
approach of the earlier works in that he derives pricing rules for
the public sector operating under a budget constraint but in an 
economy where quantity rationing prevails. He deals with the
specific instance of Keynesian unemployment. The framework of his 
model is similar to the Boiteux model in some respects in that there 
are 1 privately produced goods supplied by j number of private firms 
and k publicly supplied goods, both of which are demanded by the H 
consumers of this economy. However, the similarity ends here in that 
the publicly and privately supplied goods are disjoint, and hence, the 
vector of prices for the two sets of goods are different. More
84
importantly, excess supply in the labour and product markets are 
explicitly modeled so that Dreze features the reservation wages of 
labour in his results.
Moreover, the novelty of the Dreze work lies in the use of a 
general equilibrium framework that takes account of the macroeconomic 
effects of price changes in the public sector on consumers, private 
firms and the government undertaking, and the corresponding welfare 
implications. Maintaining the notation used by the Dr&ze, and
denoting $, IT and L as net public sector revenue, profits of the 
private firm and aggregate employment respectively, the first order 
necessary conditions are:
At a n  i n t e r i o r  s o l u t i o n ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  m u l t i p l i e r  p  >  s u c h  t h a t :  
pd^/dp^I^X*1 (8v^/3r^) [ z^-G*1 (dn/dp2 ) -/3h (d$/dpz ) - (w-w£) (3l*V3L) dL/dpz ] (2)
A close look at (2) would indicate that it is very similar to
the terms in the optimality condition of Boiteux, equation (1) above,
except for the last term on the RHS of (2) — (w-w|i) (3l^/3L)dL/dpz 
which arises here because of market disequilibrium. This expression 
evaluates the welfare effects of a change in total employment: "If
increasing pz leads to less employment (dL/dpz<0), some households see 
their labour supply further constrained ((3l^/3L)(dL/dpz) < 0), at a 
loss of welfare (per unit of labour time) equal to the difference
between the foregone market wage and the reservation wage w£."( Dreze, 
1984). Quite obviously, we would not expect this expression in the
Boiteux optimality condition; given his assumptions of a competitive 
market structure, the market and reservation wages are equal.
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The total derivatives d<J?/dpz, d!T/dpz and dL/dpz are the 
"multiplier effects" of changes in public sector prices, pz, on 
public sector net revenues <f>, on private profits n, and aggregate 
employment L. The multiplier effects here refer to the reaction of 
household demand to the change in pz, which in turn entails 
adjustments in private profits and employment. These latter 
second-round effects induce a further response in household behaviour, 
and so forth so that the final impact on L and n, following the 
multiplier process through is denoted as: dL/dpg and dn/dpg. These two 
multiplier terms are reflected in the net revenue accruing to the 
public sector, d$/dpg, due to the interaction between the public and 
private supply and aggregate employment.
Therefore, the interpretation of (2) for p>0, is that it 
reduces to a cost-benefit analysis of adjustments in the public sector 
price, where the benefits and costs are evaluated in a more 
comprehensive manner than in (1) insofar as "all multiplier effects" 
are taken into account.
Addressing the question of the "reform problem" as discussed 
in Guesnerie (1977, 1981) for the case where the budget constraint of 
the public sector is not binding, and p=0, it is necessary to search 
for price changes which improve welfare, i.e. price changes dpz at 
which (dA/dpg)dpg>0 where A is the Lagrangian of the Dreze 
optimisation problem. These "infinitesimal" price changes are in the 
direction of weIfare-improving price changes. And if the budget 
constraint is binding, then additionally, these price changes dpz are 
such that they satisfy: (d$/dpz)dpz = 0 indicating that the budget
constraint is satisfied, and also that (dA/dpz)dpz>0.
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I do not give the details of the formulae simply because of 
the tedium of reproducing the algebra here.
(5.3) Optimal Pricing with constraints on the private sector
Against this backdrop of some of the literature briefly 
reviewed here, I address the same problem of optimal public sector 
pricing but in the context of the present model. The private sector is 
assumed to encounter quantity rationing. I adapt the Dreze model, and 
the principal new elements are: a) a change in the budget constraint, 
to allow for bond/money financing of the government deficits, and b) 
to characterise rules for optimal public sector prices in the dynamic 
context of an over-lapping generations model. As seen earlier in 
chapter 4, the method of financing the government budget constraint is 
important both for determining the effects of the different policy 
instruments as well as for the stability properties of the model. The 
use of an over-lapping generations model, on the other hand, appears 
to be the natural framework for examining the dynamics of a changing
government budget constraint, and also to analyse the optimal
time-path of prices as shown in chapter 6, the next chapter.
The goals of the government and the public firm are assumed 
to coincide, and the concern here is only with the normative issues of 
deriving optimal behavioural rules for the public firm. I concentrate 
on second-best pricing rules for the public sector operating under a 
budget constraint, and that attempts to take account of the
macroeconomic effects of its pricing. The two alternative financing 
mechanisms of endogenous money and bond creation are studied, the
former type of financing in this chapter and in the subsequent 
chapter, I consider bond financing. The decision not to consider
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equity and welfare issues in any great detail, as in Dreze or Bbs, at
this stage is primarily to keep the analysis simple. Moreover, our
results do incorporate distributional considerations, albeit in a 
rather stylised fashion. In our economy at any given time, there is a 
representative individual of each generation so that equity here would 
simply be in terms of the welfare representation of the old and the 
young of that time.
The constraints on product supply by private firms results 
in their producing at a level at which the marginal product of labour 
exceeds the real wage: w/py < f'(ly) [see Chapter 2].
The problem of the government is to maximise an
appropriately chosen social welfare function using suitable policy 
variables. In the particular context of an over-lapping generations 
model, we may take as the social welfare function the welfare
function, S, (Samuelson 1958, 1975) given below. Then we have:
s = It-O.c 5t wt (3)
where,
wt = UX( cf ) + S'U2( c{j+1) (4)
Wt is the life-time utility of the generation born in period 
t, deriving utility from consumption of Ct when young at time t, 
and utility U2 consuming Ct+  ^ when old in the subsequent time of t+1. 
In the many consumer case, the individual rate of time preference 8' 
may not necessarily be the same as the social rate of discount 5 but 
in the context of our model, the two discount rates are assumed to 
coincide, and 0<6<1.
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Now as seen in chapter 2, c| is the vector of demands of 
the young of generation t: c£ = (x^g^mt/b^) each element of which is 
a function of the product prices Pt,y anc* Pt,g' wages wt, individual 
after tax income s n^+wL^ -Tt = py^tYt + wtlg#t - Tt/ interest rate 
qt as well as the expected price of Y, Py,t+1* 0n the °ther hand, the 
consumption of the old at time t, is a function only of their
savings which equals the previous period's bond and money stocks 
(bt_i+mt_i)/ and among the current prices, just the price of Y, Py,t* 
This implies that we can rewrite (4) in terms of V' defined as the 
indirect utility function:
V' “ v't Pt, p§,t+l»Kt 1 (5)
where pt is the vector of current prices. It is important to note that 
Ljj, total labour demand, does not enter V' separately but only via the 
disposable income term Kt . The reason for this lies in our having 
assumed that labour does not enter the utility function.
Some further transformations enable us to express (5) 
entirely in terms of current prices and incomes. Suppose now that all 
price expectations are rational and unit elastic; by the assumption of
V V'
rationality, Py,t+1 “ Py,t+1 anc* unit elastic expectations is 
satisfied for Py/t+l” 0Py,t. Then, a likely candidate to consider is 
Py,t+1 = @ Py*t' 80 that the indirect utility function is a function
of only [pt, Kt, 0], and
V = v [ pt, Kt; 0] (6)
In deriving optimal pricing rules, we consider two 
alternative financing mechanisms of the government deficit: money
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financing and bond financing. First, we deal with pricing rules under 
pure money financing so that both Tt and Bt = = 0, and consider
the case when the economy is at the Steady State. I assume the 
existence of the Steady State since the models of Benassy are very 
similar to my own, and Benassy proves the existence of the Steady 
State in like models under similar assumptions.
(5.3.1) Optimal Pricing
The government determines its optimal policy by maximising 
the welfare function S*, subject to its budget constraint at the 
steady state. It is readily verified that the steady state social
welfare function implied by the indirect utility function (6) and 
welfare function (3) 
above is given by:
S* = v[p,K,0]6/(l-5) (7)
The need to consider the social welfare function at the steady state
arises from the fact that in the context of an over-lapping
generations model, there is neither a "representative point" of time 
nor a "representative generation" as is often possible to assume in 
most of the literature whilst determining optimal policies in a single 
period model.
From individual utility maximisation, consumption demand is 
set by the vector of prices, pt, and disposable income, Kt . Since the 
supply of both the private and public goods, Yt and Gt respectively, 
are demand determined in this Keynesian unemployment regime, we may 
express the supply of Y and G as functions of the variables which
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determine their demands so that Y^= Y(pj-,Kt,/3), and Gt * G(pt ,Kt ,/3). 
With reference to the labour demand in the two sectors, it is worth 
recalling that both are technology determined so that l(j^y=f“^(Y)= 
ly(Pt'Kt'P) and *-9 ® Q“1(0) = ^(Pt'Kt'^)’
However, unlike most other models, the labour and private 
product market clearing conditions are not treated as constraints in 
the exercise solving for the "optimal" public sector price. The 
reason for this lies in our use of an overlapping generations model 
with a single representative individual of each generation in this 
economy featuring excess supply in both markets. There is only one 
member of the young generation who supplies labour at any instant of 
time, and hence, both the amount of labour supplied and the labour 
demand constraint coincide. The extension to many goods, many 
consumers and producers, has been done elsewhere using by now fairly 
standard techniques but all these earlier models are strictly confined 
to a single period time-frame. In the dynamic context of the present 
model using overlapping generations, any such extension to several 
goods and individual agents should be relatively straightforward since 
the solution techniques could, by and large, be the same as those used 
by previous authors, and therefore, it would appear that no new 
important insights are to be gained by this extension of the (my) 
model.
Now, coming to the government budget constraint, two major 
changes are made. I drop the assumption of a binding zero-budget 
constraint so that $ is no longer necessarily equated to zero. Suppose 
we were to continue with the original assumption of <t>=0, then this, in 
effect, renders irrelevant the whole issue of "optimal" public sector 
prices since the only price consistent with this budget requirement at
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the Steady State, where Mt=Mt_i, is marginal cost pricing. Therefore, 
it becomes essential to modify the government budget constraint for 
otherwise one would simply be begging the question of optimal pricing.
Similarly, the reason for considering pure money financing, 
and where there are no lump sum taxes is the following. Suppose
indeed 4>=0, and there are lump sum taxes, then = T + (PgG-wlg) = 0 
at the Steady State. The obvious solution to the optimal choice of 
public sector prices is Pg=0 for this would appear to maximise 
individual utility. The optimal lump-sum tax T is equated to the 
labour costs of public production so that T=wlg. Also, it is important 
to note that there are no distributional costs of levying this tax, 
that needs taking account of, since there is only a single young 
consumer paying the tax at any given point of time in this model. 
However, some considered thinking leads to the conclusion that there 
are both economic and other arguments against persuing this policy as 
discussed below.
In more general situations where such lump-sum taxes are not 
feasible, then the issue of public sector pricing becomes pertinent. A 
very plausible case against the introduction of such taxes would be, 
for instance, the costs of setting up the requisite administrative
machinery. Furthermore, the recent experience in the U.K. is a pointer 
to the hefty political costs of introducing the poll tax which quite 
clearly appears to be taking its toll on the ruling government. As a 
follow on, the next question arises: are governments willing to pay 
such a high political cost when a more painless and standard
alternative exists of financing the operations of the state-owned 
enterprise by charging a price for the goods produced by the
enterprise?
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Furthermore, the comparative statics of chapter 3 indicate 
that, under commonly assumed demand responses, lump-sum taxes have 
contractionary effects on aggregate income and employment. On the 
other hand, as analysed in chapter 3, it is possible to levy a 
(positive) price without political detriment. Also, by an 
appropriately chosen pricing policy, along the lines detailed in 
chapter 3, it would be possible to even increase aggregate demand and 
reduce the rate of labour unemployment! Therefore, the "solution" of 
setting T=wlg with a zero price for the public sector good seems 
myopic public policy.
4
Solving the model
Therefore, the government determines the welfare optimal 
public sector price by maximising the following Lagrangian function:
Max L = V(pg, K(pg)) + «!( PgG-wlg ] (8)
The is the associated dual variable of the government
budget constraint = PgG - wig, and <i> is not necessarily zero.
From the first-order necessary conditions, the optimal public 
sector pricing rule, taking account of the multiplier effects on 
aggregate income, K, is:
Lp - vp + VkKp + ax[ pg - 5 ^ 9  ] + Ql G = 0
y
= -OG + aKp + ^1[Pg “ w01g/0G]3G/3pg + ajG = 0  (9)
using Roy's identity.
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Interpretation of optimality condition (9)
The interpretation of (9) is along the lines of Dreze in 
terms of the cost-benefit analysis of a price change in the public
marginal utility of income, the optimality condition is rewritten as:
since Vj^a, and the second term on the left-hand side of (10) follows 
from the definition of K as K = n +wL. For > 0# the marginal 
revenue to the public sector of, say, an increase in Pg is given by 
the right-hand side. The total marginal cost to the consumer of the 
price increase is given by the left-hand side. The price increase 
alters the real income of the household, both directly and indirectly. 
The direct effects are through the consumption effect equivalent to a 
loss of nominal income of G, while the indirect effects are through 
the income effects on profit and wage income. Therefore, the 
optimality condition (10) can be viewed as requiring the marginal 
costs of a price increase to the consumer to be proportional to the 
marginal net benefits to the public enterprise where the factor
of proportionality.
The analysis here is close to that of BOs in determining the 
relationsip between pg and marginal cost. By dividing through by o^, 
(9) is rewritten as:
sector. Using Roy's identity and denoting a as the individual
(10)
L p  =  ( l - X ) G  +  X ( d K / d P g )  +  ( p g
where X=a/c*i > 0.
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There are two alternative possible scenarios now.
Case (i): o k c x i i.e., the government would like to levy a lump-sum tax
(1—X)>0, then the second term is also positive since the own price 
effect of Pg is negative. Lastly, if the goods Y and G are 
substitutes, and if the effect of the price change in pg on the the 
private sector good outweighs the own price effect, then the overall 
effect on aggregate income K is expansionary: 0K/3pg > 0 .  In this
situation, the optimal public sector price is greater than marginal 
cost w8lg/0G. But if the two good are complements, then we do not have 
a definite answer on theoretical grounds alone about the magnitude of 
Pg relative to marginal cost. In short, the net effect depends on the 
relative magnitude of the effects on private firm profits, 9ll/0pg, 
following a change in public sector price vis-a-vis the income and 
employment effects since, by definition, K=IT+wL = pyY+wlg. However, 
under the most commonly assumed demand responses of the private sector 
output and the publicly produced good being substitutes, we have a 
clear-cut pricing rule that public sector price be set above marginal 
cost. Furthermore, we have explicit and measurable indicators of the 
factors determing the mark-up of price over marginal cost.
An Example:
I consider the Cobb-Douglas utility function to illustrate 
circumstances where the effect of a public sector price change on
From (10)', we have:
pg “ w “is0- ' (1_X) <*3/dPg
G
(11)
The first term on RHS of (11) is clearly positive, and if
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private output is zero or sufficiently small to be ignored, then 
effectively a change in price affects only the level of output in the 
public sector. Additionally, if there is constant returns to scale, 
0=1, in public sector production, then (10)' yields:
— —  =  —  +  — ^ — - (11)'
Pg Vg (a-^l)
where rjg = own price elasticity of demand of the public sector good G, 
and t is defined as t s (Pg~w)/Pg« The "distributional" factors are 
captured by the term a / (a-o^) on RHS of (11)', while the market demand 
factors are reflected in the term l/rjg with the cross price elasticity 
of price changes in the public sector assumed to be zero on Y, the 
privately supplied good.
The detailed derivation of (11)' is given in the appendix. 
This formulation of the optimal pricing rule facilitates comparison 
with the optimal tax literature, e.g. Ramsey (1927) and Boiteux 
(1956). The earlier work by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) draws 
parallels between the rules of optimal pricing and optimal taxation 
for the specific case considered by them. In like manner, I make a 
comparison of the Ramsey tax rules and the optimal pricing rule of 
equation (11)' above. Note, in particular, that the "distributional" 
term and l/r\ do not occur multiplicatively as in Atkinson and 
Stiglitz, for instance. Here, the two terms occur in additive form so 
that we are able to separate out the influence of each term.
The first term of (11)' indicates the familiar Ramsey result,
that the "tax" should be inversely proportional to the elasticity of
demand, and supports "what the market will bear" view in the present
context of the optimal choice of prices: the extent of the mark-up
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over marginal cost should vary inversely with the elasticity of 
demand.
The second term, a/(a-Qii), modifies the principle of charging 
a mark-up based on the inverse of the demand elasticity.
i) A larger weightage on a , for given implies a lower mark-up 
of price. This is intuitively clear because in this situation a higher 
premium is attached to individual utility and hence, this calls for a 
smaller price mark-up.
ii) On the other hand, an increase in the social value of 
government revenue, i.e. an increase in a  ^ is associated with a larger 
mark-up of public sector price, which is as one would expect.
iii) Next, I consider the situation where the government budget 
constraint is not binding and the shadow price of government net 
revenue is zero: ai=0, then,
HH=-4- + i i11*"Pg ■* Vg
Suppose our Cobb-Douglas utility function takes the simple 
form: U = YG, for which it is well known that the own price elasticity 
of demand for both goods Y and G is Vy ~ Vg = “1* follows,
therefore, that equation (11)'' is satisfied for public sector pricing 
at marginal cost: P g = w .
(iv) Finally, only for a=0 does (11)' yields the pure Ramsey rule,
I have considered above the special case of constant returns
to scale in public sector production. It is worth noting that the 
results derived here do not require us to assume the absence of income 
effects as assumed in the Atkinson and Stiglitz results. Furthermore, 
it can be shown under even weaker assumptions, of not requiring CRS in 
public sector production, that, by and large, the principal results 
derived above carry over. Suppose we relax this requirement so that 
the income effects are given by Kp=w(3lg/0G)(0G/0pg), then the 
optimality result of (11)'remains unchanged
special case of interdependent consumption demands. However, in the 
general case, where the effect of an increase in Pg on complementary 
private and publicly supplied goods leads to a reduction in total 
income dK/dpg<0, then it becomes a matter for empirical resolution 
whether Pg£w; theoretical analysis at this level draws attention to 
the issues to take account of in public sector pricing decisions.
Case (ii)
of (10)', suppose ai=a, i.e. the social marginal utility of income is 
the same as that of the individual, then X=1 and for a fixed given 
private sector price Py, the pricing rule reduces to:
(12)
except that t is now defined as t s [pg-w(01g/0G)]
This completes the discussion of optimal pricing rules in the
Reverting to the general case depicted in the optimality rule
(13)
i.e. set public sector price pg such that the ratio of prices is equal 
to the rate of substitution dY/dG, and we have the standard efficiency 
criterion.
The two remaining issues to deal with are the reform problem, 
i.e. identifying the direction of welfare-improving price changes, and 
finally, the effects of price changes vis- a-vis inflation in the 
model. Consider the case when the budget constraint is not binding, 
Gfl=0, then the welfare improving price changes are identified as d p g  
such that:
[G - dlT/dpg - wdL/dpg] dpg < 0  (14)
This can be readily interpreted by relating it to the effects 
on inflation of the price change. The total value of production is 
given by P y Y + p g G  which we define as N  for notational brevity, and 
dividing through by N we can express (13) as:
Gdpg/N - (dn/II) (II/N) - W(dL/L) (L/N) < 0 (15)
The first term is the inflation due to the price increase in 
Pg, and the second term is a measure of the change in income due to 
the change in profit income while the last term is a measure of the 
change in wage income following the changes in rate of employment 
dL/L. The combined effect of these different elements determine the 
direction of welfare improving changes in the public sector price.
Conclusions
This ends the discussion of optimal pricing in the steady
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state, and in chapter 6, I derive the rules for optimal inter-temporal 
pricing.
To sum up the results of the present chapter, if the shadow
price of government revenue is positive, then we have a pricing rule
similar to that of Dreze where we take account of the multiplier 
effects on aggregate income and employment. Differences between the 
two arise in that in my optimality result, equation (10), wage income 
is expressed in terms of the market wage, and there are no terms which 
include the reservation wage as in Dreze. This should be expected 
because, by assumption, labour does not have any disutility and 
hence, this effectively implies a reservation wage of zero.
In the situation of a binding government budget constraint 
where the shadow price of government resources exceeds the private 
marginal utility of income to the individual, it is possible to 
establish explicit guidelines for public sector prices in relation to 
marginal cost - which is one of the questions posed at the very
outset. If the publicly produced and private firm output are
substitutes, then the pricing rule tells us that price should be above 
marginal cost provided the overall effect of any price change in the 
public sector good on aggregate income is expansionary. In a 
consumption demand environment where changes in Pg have only an 
insignificant effect on the level of total private output, I develop 
the conditions for pricing at or above marginal cost, and this is 
illustrated with the specific example of a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. The two limiting situations are considered: if a^=0 implying 
a non-binding government budget constraint, then the optimal rule 
suggests marginal cost pricing. Only in the event of a=0, would the 
optimal price follow the pure Ramsey dictate of charging what the
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market will bear as determined by the inverse of the price elasticity 
of demand. In the general case, it is only when the two goods are 
complements that there is ambiguity, and then we can not say 
categorically what the relationship between price and marginal cost 
should be in the public sector. In all other situations, we have 
fairly clear-cut guidelines for determing the optimal public sector 
price, its relation to marginal cost, and also there are explicit 
indicators of the extent of the price mark-up, if any.
#
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Technical Appendix
Derivation of equation (10):
Legrangian for the problem is given by:
L - V[Pg,K(Pg )] + QilPgG - w3lg/3G] (1)
and maximising with respect to pg, the first-order condition is: 
V  VP+ KP+ “ltPg-w9lg/9G]9G/9pg + <*! G » 0 (2)
Since aggregate income K is defined as:
K = IT + w L = pyY + w lg(G)
8K/8pg a Kp = 8n/8pg + w 8lg/8G (3)
Substituting (3) in (2), and using Roy's identity, yields:
-QG+a(8n/8pg +w8lg/8G]+ a^[(pg-w8lg/8G)8G/8pg+ ajGsO (4)
Rearranging terms, (4) is rewritten as:
a[G - 8n/8pg - w8lg/8G] = 8$/8pg (5)
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Derivation of equation (11)':
If independent demands,
Kp - w (3lg/3g)3G/9Pg (l)
and substituting (1) in the first-order condition yields 
Lp= ( a - a i ) G  + a(w8lg/9G)8G/9pg + a^t 8G/8pg = 0  (2)
where t * (Pg“ w 9ig/9G )•
Using the definition of t, and dividing through by G, equation (2 
re-written as:
Lp = («l“«) + o(l-t/pg) (-i?) - ai»?(t/pg) (3)
where the own price elasticity of demand for G is denoted: 
rj = - (8G/8pg)pg/G 
Dividing (3) by (ai-a), anc* re-arranging yields: 
t/Pg = 1/V  + ot/(ot- ax) (4)
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) is
Chapter 6
OPTIMAL INTERTEMPORAL PRICING
(6.1\Introduction
Finally, in this chapter, the discussion focuses on pricing 
rules using the method of analysis of Diamond (1973) and subsequently, 
followed by Atkinson and Sandmo (1980). Rather than to start out by 
considering a representative generation, and deriving optimal pricing 
rules at the Steady State, the approach taken is different now. The 
financing of the government deficit is assumed to be through bond 
issue and tax revenues. We study the recursive behavioural relations 
generated by the changing bond stock financing a non-zero government 
budget. Having done this, it is only in the next step that 
stationarity is assumed, and the rules of optimal pricing 
characterised at the Steady State. The rationale for this alternative 
approach has its roots in the Growth literature, where there is the 
"Golden Rule of Savings" derived at the Steady State, and the savings 
rules that look at the dynamic time path of the optimal level of 
savings, Solow (1987) and Dixit (1976).
(6.2\Pricing and allocation
We introduce the notion of the state valuation function, 
H (Pg,t-l'Bt-l'Tt-l) to represent the maximal level of welfare, 
discounted to time t, that can be attained given the initial values of 
the variables inherited in time t. The government maximises the 
social welfare function V ( p g , K ( p g , T ) ), as given in equation (6),
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chapter 5, by choosing Pg,t anc* Tt subject to its budget constraints
Bt “ lBt-l+wt1g/t“Pg'tGt"Tt1/^t <*)
We apply the principle of optimality of dynamic programming, 
as in Diamond(1973) and Atkinson and Sandmo (1980). In view of the 
stationarity of the problem:
H(t) * HiPg't-l'Zt-l'tt-l)
= max{V(t) + /i H(t+l)(pg/t,Bt,Tt)> (2)
where Bt in H(t+1) is given by equation (1), and 0</i<l.
The first-order necessary conditions for optimality are set 
out below in terms of the choice of Pg,t and Tt* Tb® sub-scripts 
i=l-3 refer to differentiation of H with respect pg, B and T 
respectively.
-Vp/g = (i Hx(t+1) + n H2 (t+l)0Bt/8pg/t (3)
and,
-VT = n H3 (t+1) + fi H2 (t+1)0Bt/0Tt (4)
The second set of equations are those obtained by differentiating the 
recursion relation (2) with respect to the state variables Pg,t-1'
Bt_i and T^-i respectively:
HX(t) = y. (5)
H2 (t) = n  H2 (t+l)(l/qt) (6)
H3(t) = n Hjlt+lXl/qtiaBt.i/aTt.i (7)
Assuming that an optimum policy exists and that it converges 
to a steady state (see chapter 4), we turn to the interpretation of 
these results in the next section.
(6.3) Interpretation of the results
Focusing on the steady state properties, from (6) we 
observe that H2 (t)=H2 (t+1) or:
/* = q = l/(l+r) (8)
At this point it is worth recalling some of the behavioural 
and macroeconomic relations mentioned earlier. From the bond market 
equilibrium equation, Bt is equated to bt, but bt is the savings of 
the old of generation t to finance its consumption when old. Also, 
from the individual budget constraint, we have:
k£ = Py,txt + Pg,tGt + 1tbt
and,
bt * Py,t+1 xt+l 
The definition of disposable income is:
K? = Py,tYt + wlg,t - Tt <10>
(9)
(9)'
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while the private product market clearing equation is:
Py,tYt “ Py,txt + Bt-1 
Therefore, from equations (10) and (11), we have:
£t = Py,txt + Bt-1 +wt1g,t - Tt <12)
so that equations (9) and (12), yields:
qtbt - + (wtlg/t - Pg,t Gt) " Tt (13>
The optimality condition (3) is recalled below:
- Vp(g = ft Hj(t+1) + n  H2<t+l)3Bt/3pg(t 
and from equation (5) above, we substitute for H^ft+l) as:
Hj(t+1) -  p. H2 (t+2) ( l/qt+1)(3Bt/3pgjt) (14)
so that equation (3) is rewritten as:
—vp,g “ [M H2(t+2)(l/qt+1)(3Bt/3pg(t ] + (I H2 (t+l)3Bt/3pg>t (15)
and at the steady state, (15) is re-written as:
-Vp,g/H2 = 3 3B/3pg+3((wig -pgG)+ Bt_! - T t  ]/3pg (16)
since /t = q, and the second term on RHS of (16) is derived by 
substituting (13) above.
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Therefore, our optimal public sector price satisfies:
<a/H2)[G-np/g_wdI,/dpg ) = q3B/3pg + [(w3lg/3G - pg )3o/3pg- G] (17)
The term a / H2 is the private marginal utility of income in 
terms of the 'shadow price' of government revenue, H2 . This has been 
"referred to in the optimum tax literature as the 'net social marginal 
valuation of income' (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980)". The term on 
the right side of the optimality condition is the change in 
government revenue arising from the response of individual 
consumption demand and the consequent changes in labour employment and 
income in the public sector.
Next, we need to determine the value of a/I^. From the 
second optimality condition (4) and the first order condition (7), we 
have:
H3(t+1> = ,1 H2 (fc+2) [-^i—  -|§i-] (18)
and substituting in (4) yields:
f 1 1LT = VT + )([ )t H2(t+2) +
+ n  H2 (t+1)-|— [ w - pg - (/l/ qt)H2 (t+l) = 0 (19)
Therefore, at the steady state where H2 (t)=H2 (t+l)=H2 ) =H2' 
and also qt= <2t+j = /* f°r 3• ec[uation (19) implies, using Roy's
identity, that:
H y  - q <9b/9T> + [ w 35° _ Pg] ~ l r  ‘ 1 <2°)
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(6.4) Conclusion
A comparison of equations (10), chapter 5, and (20) indicates 
that the valuation of marginal costs to the consumer is rather similar 
in both approaches. However, the marginal net benefits to the public 
enterprise are appraised differently: the latter method requires
taking account of the changes in the financial instruments as well, in 
this instance, changes in the bond stock. Also, we have in equation 
(20) a well defined rule for computing a/H2 , the social valuation of 
the individual's marginal utility of income.
As a topic of future research, it is intended to extend the 
above analysis in a dynamic context to examine the relative merits of 
lump-sum taxes vis.a.vis. charging prices above marginal cost for the 
public sector good. This analysis should be relatively straightforward 
since there is already a wealth of literature on the similarities 
between indirect taxes and pricing in a static context, and likewise 
there is by now fairly standard work on the comparison of direct taxes 
and indirect taxes.
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